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Italy boasts the fourth-largest military establishment within the European Union 
and the sixth-largest in NATO, so Italian national security efforts and collective 
contributions have trans-European and even global significance. Italy has historically 
been an avid supporter of European integration, but nationalist movements promoting 
euroscepticism or isolationism threaten to alter both the Italian and the European security 
landscape. Three major political parties in Italy—the Northern League, the Five Star 
Movement, and Forza Italia—present nationalist positions of differing magnitude that 
could threaten Italy’s pro-European Union position. It is consistent with U.S. and 
Alliance interests, therefore, to examine the most important factors fueling nationalist 
movements and to assess the security implications of these movements’ policies. This 
thesis surveys the main nationalist movements in contemporary Italy and identifies seven 
factors that promote Italian nationalism or euroscepticism: a tumultuous history and 
political environment, the north–south divide, the Italian national character, a struggling 
national economy, Italian-Russian relations, EU and NATO enlargement, and the 
ongoing immigration crisis. This thesis also examines Italy’s role in the major Euro-
Atlantic security institutions and assesses how nationalist movements may affect the 
country’s international security role. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Italianità—the identity and essence of being Italian—is usually easily recognized 
but much harder to describe. Italians often stand out for their passionate and flamboyant 
style, yet there are many more layers underlying the national character. Regional divides 
within the nation are distinct, moreover, and most Italians tend to identify more strongly 
with local or regional identities than with the nation. Since the end of World War II, 
Italy—along with much of the rest of Europe—has also decisively moved toward greater 
Europeanism. Regionalist, nationalist, and eurosceptical movements within Italy, drawing 
support from a number of sources, nevertheless threaten to reverse trends toward 
Europeanism. Heated debate thus revolves around the tradeoffs between regionalism, 
nationalism, and Europeanism. 
In the minds of many Italians, the desire for further European integration has been 
replaced by eurocriticism or even euroscepticism. In 2013, the Istituto Affari 
Internazionali published a paper entitled “Eurocriticism: The Eurozone Crisis and Anti-
Establishment Groups in Southern Europe” that painted a bleak outlook for pro-European 
public sentiment.1 The reputation of the European Union (EU) suffered during the global 
financial crisis that began in 2008 and popular skepticism has grown across southern 
Europe in recent years. The Eurobarometer estimated that in 2007 only 28% of Italians 
distrusted the EU, but by the end of 2013 that number had risen to 61%.2 On a broader 
scale, a Pew Research poll indicated that only 45% of Europeans in the EU had a 
favorable view of the EU in 2013—down from 60% in 2012.3 According to Roberto 
Weber, a polling expert from the IXE institute, “rising discontent with the EU is a clear 
byproduct of the economic crisis…but…when push comes to shove, a majority of Italians 
                                                 
1 Thanos Dokos, Eleonora Poli, Chiara Rosselli, Eduard Soler i Lecha and Nathalie Tocci, 
Eurocriticism: The Eurozone Crisis and Anti-Establishment Groups in Southern Europe, Istituto Affari 
Internazionali, IAI Working Papers 13, December 2013, http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/eurocriticism. 
2 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 67 (Spring 2007), 97–98, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm. 
3 Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project, The New Sick Man of Europe: the European Union, 
May 2013, 13, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/13/the-new-sick-man-of-europe-the-european-union. 
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would be sceptical of radical departures from traditional EU-oriented policy-making.”4 
Increasing support for radical anti-euro and anti-EU platforms, however, contradicts such 
an assertion and suggests that surging nationalism and regionalism (notably in northern 
Italy) may push Italians to take extreme measures. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question to be answered is: What security implications stem from 
competing forms of Italian nationalism? This thesis investigates the security implications 
of Italian nationalism, especially within the context of the principal Euro-Atlantic 
security institutions—NATO and the EU. Four sub-questions are considered in order to 
answer this question. First, what are the main nationalist movements in Italy today? 
Second, what factors are promoting euroscepticism and Italian nationalism? Third, what 
is Italy’s role in the major Euro-Atlantic defense and security institutions, especially 
NATO and the EU? Lastly, how could nationalist movements in Italy affect the country’s 
role in these institutions and in international security? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Italy has historically been one of the strongest supporters of European integration. 
From a security perspective, Italy maintains one of the largest European militaries and 
plays a key role in the EU, NATO, and other international organizations. Thus, Italian 
security efforts—both national and collective contributions—have trans-European and 
even global effects. 
Nationalist movements promoting euroscepticism could alter the European 
security landscape. Euroscepticism has gained prominence in Italy in recent years, and 
the future of Italy’s traditional pro-EU position is uncertain. Multiple movements 
promote nationalism or Euroscepticism, and security ramifications vary for each. It is 
consistent with U.S. and Alliance interests, therefore, to examine the most influential 
nationalist movements and to assess the security implications of their policies. 
                                                 
4 Roberto Weber quoted in Alvise Armellini, “Anti-Euro Talk Spreads in Italy,” EUobserver, April 24, 
2014, https://euobserver.com/eu-elections/123906. 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis addresses the issues raised in the four research sub-questions by 
identifying the major movements promoting nationalism or euroscepticism, exploring the 
range of underlying causal factors, examining Italy’s security positions, and offering an 
assessment of the security implications stemming from nationalism or Euroscepticism. 
Three major Italian political parties have expressed significant opposition to the current 
level of integration with EU members: the Lega Nord, or Northern League (LN); the 
Movimento Cinque Stelle, or Five Star Movement (M5S); and Forza Italia (FI). The 
Northern League is fueled by strong sentiments of both regionalism and nationalism; the 
League is perhaps best known for its concept of a northern Italian region that is 
supposedly superior to Italy’s southern regions. This mythical region, which the League 
has named Padania, lacks both a clear definition and historical substance. Nonetheless, 
there are distinct similarities among northern regions when contrasted with southern 
regions, so the merits of the Padania concept will be further examined. The Five Star 
Movement and Forza Italia appeal more to economic priorities than to nationalist 
agendas. These parties, especially the Five Star Movement, may nonetheless evoke 
nationalist leanings as avid proponents of euroscepticism. 
Several underlying factors are conducive to nationalist or eurosceptical views in 
Italy. The struggling national economy receives the most press, yet other applicable 
factors cannot be ignored. This thesis proposes that six other factors also contribute to 
nationalist or eurosceptical views in Italy: a tumultuous history and political environment, 
the north-south divide, the Italian national character, Italian-Russian relations, EU and 
NATO enlargement, and the ongoing immigration crisis. 
After establishing Italy’s role in the major Euro-Atlantic defense and security 
institutions (NATO and the EU), this thesis examines the possible security implications 
of nationalism and euroscepticism. The security implications that stem from the 
competing forms of nationalism are evident in some areas and more subtle in others. The 
immigration crisis is at the forefront of many voters’ minds, and each political party has a 
different view on how to address the crisis. The far-right and perhaps xenophobic 
Northern League advocates the most extreme anti-immigration policy; others take a less 
 4 
extreme approach which still differs significantly from the status quo. Within the context 
of the main Euro-Atlantic security institutions, simple membership differs from 
committed support. Even if eurosceptical parties desire to retain national membership in 
these Euro-Atlantic institutions, ideological leanings will nonetheless influence the level 
of contribution and support to security efforts under their auspices. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Scholarly literature on individuals’ attitudes regarding the tradeoff between 
nationalism and Europeanism has taken four general approaches: instrumental or 
utilitarian, cognitive mobilization, political cues, and cultural and identity factors.5 
Instrumental or utilitarian approaches offer an economy-driven explanation, whereas the 
other three approaches are non-economic.6 According to the instrumental or utilitarian 
perspective, citizens evaluate the economic benefits and costs of European integration for 
themselves and their associated social groups (which includes the state). Public opinion 
under this approach is thus regarded as a rational calculation based upon the perceived 
economic advantages or disadvantages. Cognitive mobilization, first advanced by Ronald 
Inglehart in 1970, posits that growth in education levels and the availability of 
information has brought about an increased awareness that causes citizens of European 
countries to look increasingly toward multinational political and economic cooperation in 
Europe.7 Other authors have argued that explanations revolve around national politics, 
which filters public opinion and can make Europeanism a more or less attractive 
alternative.8 Cultural and identity explanations, arguing that some groups are more likely 
than others to identify as European while still others demonstrate overriding national or 
local identities, have also become popular in the last two decades.9  
                                                 
5 Fabio Serricchio, “Italian Citizens and Europe: Explaining the Growth of Euroscepticism,” Bulletin 
of Italian Politics 4, no. 1 (2012): 123, http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_239888_en.pdf. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 124. 
8 Ibid., 126. 
9 Ibid., 123. 
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Literature on the nationalism-Europeanism tradeoff specific to Italy is limited, 
although Fabio Serricchio’s 2012 study draws noteworthy conclusions for each of the 
four perspectives described previously. First, Italians still view European integration as a 
net benefit for both individuals and the nation.10 Second, higher education levels among 
Italians generally correspond with stronger Europeanism.11 Third, euroscepticism in Italy 
is highly dependent upon political stability12 and governing parties.13 Fourth, European 
integration may threaten not only strong national and local identities but also the 
European identity, which Italians tend to ascribe to Western Europeans but are more 
hesitant to extend to the new EU members in Eastern Europe.14 
Although some scholars describe the ECSC and the follow-on European 
Communities as short-term failures, most agree that the communities paved the way for 
long-term success. William Diebold’s The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic 
Cooperation, 1950–1959 found no evidence of a measurable economic impact by the 
ECSC.15 Ernst Haas’ The Uniting of Europe (1958) was one of many works predicting 
that integration through the ECSC would produce spillover benefits elsewhere; Haas 
apologized in the 1968 reissue of his book that the carryover benefits had failed to 
materialize as predicted.16 Integration did, however, help iron out European issues that 
needed to be addressed sooner or later and promote lasting peace between longtime rivals 
France and Germany.17 John Gillingham writes that “the birth of Europe resulted from a 
                                                 
10 Serricchio, “Italian Citizens and Europe,” 131. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Serricchio’s argument is based upon a relative stabilization of national politics leading up to 2012, 
but this thesis argues that national political dynamics have since been destabilized. 
13 Serricchio, “Italian Citizens and Europe,” 131. 
14 Ibid. 
15 William Diebold quoted in John Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955: the 
Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), ix, https://goo.gl/h5I4du. 
16 Ernst Haas quoted in Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, ix. 
17 Germany was divided into the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Federal 
Republic of Germany (West Germany) from 1949 to 1990; only West Germany joined NATO and the 
European Communities during this period. 
 6 
natural process but was not a painless act…France, West Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg did not mesh together effortlessly and 
automatically…they had to be heavily lubricated, sometimes reshaped and occasionally 
even forced together in order to get Europe to run.”18 Tony Judt argued in 1996 that the 
post-war conditions necessitated the formation of the EU predecessors but that further 
integration between EU members was no longer necessary.19 
Both Italian center-right and center-left political parties nonetheless displayed 
fervent Europeanism during the infancy years of the EU.20 Since the turn of the century, 
center-left parties have generally exhibited continuing pro-European sentiment as the 
center-right has gradually abandoned or qualified such sentiments.21 The current Prime 
Minister, Matteo Renzi of the center-left Democratic Party, has followed that trend by 
displaying strong support for both the EU and NATO. Some expert observers, however, 
have argued that the future of Italy within the EU hinges upon Renzi’s success as Prime 
Minister.22 According to Tony Barber of the Financial Times, “The main problem 
is…that practically half the political spectrum—from Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia 
party to Matteo Salvini’s Northern League and the Five-Star Movement—is represented 
by forces that espouse eurosceptic or anti-euro policies.”23 Renzi’s Democratic Party 
received only 25 percent of the popular vote in the 2013 parliamentary elections, meaning 
that the Democratic Party is outnumbered two-to-one by those moving away from 
Europeanism. 
                                                 
18 Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 297. 
19 Tony Judt, A Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), 118. 
20 Nicolò Conti and Elisabetta De Giorgi, “L’Euroscetticismo a Parole: Lega Nord e Rifondazione 
Comunista, tra Retorica e Comportamento Istituzionale,” [Euroscepticism in Words: The Northern League 
and the Communist Refoundation, between Rhetoric and Institutional Behavior,] Rivista Italiana di Scienza 
Politica 41, no. 2 (2011): 266, http://www.sisp.it/files/papers/2010/nicolo-conti-e-elisabetta-de-giorgi-
749.pdf. 
21 Conti and De Giorgi, “L’Euroscetticismo a Parole,” [Euroscepticism in Words,] 266. 
22 Tony Barber, “Renzi Is the Last Hope for the Italian Elite,” Financial Times, January 1, 2015, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/21f3bf46-86cd-11e4-9c2d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3QEuqsPS7.  
23 Ibid.  
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The three political parties noted by Barber have demonstrated varying degrees of 
opposition to the current level of integration in the EU. The Northern League is currently 
Italy’s oldest and most controversial major political party.24 The rise of the Northern 
League during the 1990s is well-documented. Controversial secessionist views captured 
headlines, and with the headlines came a substantial amount of literature. The majority of 
the scholarly literature focuses on this time period; two such books contribute greatly to 
this thesis: Nationalism in Italian Politics: The Stories of the Northern League, 1980–
2000 by Damian Tambini and The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian 
Politics by Anna Cento Bull and Mark Gilbert.25  Limited scholarly literature exists after 
the 1990s, perhaps because the League polled less strongly in the 2000s and has been less 
boisterous in its recent calls for secession. The ongoing Mediterranean immigration 
crisis, among other factors, has reinvigorated interest in the party, but the scholarly 
literature has yet to catch up to this recent phenomenon. 
The nationalist or Eurosceptic positions of the Five Star Movement and Forza 
Italia are less documented by scholarly sources. This is due in part to the evolving 
landscape of Italian politics. Created in 2009, M5S was given little heed until it took 26 
percent of the vote in its first general election in 2013.26 Forza Italia, meanwhile, has 
changed names twice in the past decade as the byproduct of party mergers and 
dissolutions. FI first merged with the Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance) and others 
to form Il Popolo della Libertà (People of Freedom) in 2009; this new party dissolved in 
2013 and the Berlusconi-led faction re-adopted the name of Forza Italia. The party has 
retained a platform mostly consistent with center-right positions under the leadership of 
Silvio Berlusconi although the shifts preclude the retention of specific policy positions 
from the pre-2013 iterations in the current version of FI policy. 
                                                 
24 The largest Italian political parties during the Cold War – Democrazia Cristiana and the Partito 
Comunista Italiano – were dissolved in the early 1990s. 
25 Damian Tambini, Nationalism in Italian Politics: The Stories of the Northern League, 1980–
2000 (London: Routledge, 2001), http://www.tandfebooks.com/isbn/9780203164556; Anna Cento Bull and 
Mark Gilbert, The Lega Nord and the Northern Question in Italian Politics (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2001). 
26 Gianfranco Pasquino and Marco Valbruzzi, “Post-Electoral Politics in Italy: Institutional Problems 
and Political Perspectives,” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 18, no. 4 (2013), 469, 473. 
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E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis contains four follow-on chapters: Italian nationalist movements, factors 
promoting nationalism or euroscepticism in Italy, Italy’s role in Euro-Atlantic security 
and defense, and a conclusion assessing the security implications of nationalist 
movements in Italy. Chapter II establishes the historical context of Italian nationalism 
and clarifies, in order from most radical to least radical, the nationalist or eurosceptical 
positions of the Northern League, the Five Star Movement, and Forza Italia. The 
Northern League campaigns on the economic and cultural supremacy of Padania and is 
overtly hostile toward Rome and Brussels alike. The Five Star Movement is sceptical of 
the EU but publicly advocates only withdrawal from the euro zone vice complete 
withdrawal from the EU. Some party members, including party leader Beppe Grillo, also 
advocate exiting NATO.27 Forza Italia is even less overtly eurosceptical but is 
opportunist when it perceives that euroscepticism will benefit its interests. 
Chapter III examines seven key factors that promote nationalism and/or 
euroscepticism in Italy: a tumultuous history and political environment, regional divides, 
the Italian national character, a struggling economy in the aftermath of the euro zone 
crisis, Russian relations, enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic security institutions, and the 
ongoing immigration crisis. Chapter IV focuses on Italy’s role in NATO and the EU, 
analyzing contributions to both Euro-Atlantic security institutions. An examination of 
how the EU and NATO support or undermine Italian national interests is then provided.  
Finally, Chapter V assesses the security implications stemming from nationalism 
and euroscepticism and offers recommendations to address some of these issues. 
Regarding NATO and the EU, this thesis concludes that nationalist movements largely 
remain committed to NATO but also tend to alter Italy’s behavior within the Alliance as 
well as the Alliance’s prioritization of issues. Nationalist movements are much more 
critical of the EU, and a complete exit from the EU is unlikely yet also quite possible. 
Even if Italy remains in EU, these movements affect Italy’s level of support for the EU. 
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II. CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS 
Studies carried out by social psychologists, according to Fabio Serricchio, 
“suggest that attachment to the nation and to Europe are not contradictory.”28 Other 
scholars disagree. Tony Judt asserted that “it is not psychologically realistic to posit…a 
local and supranational duality of communities around which allegiances may form.”29 In 
2000, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, then the President of the Italian Republic, declared, “There 
is no contradiction at all between the love of one’s city or region, the love for the 
motherland and the love for Europe. I love my city, Livorno, Tuscany, Italy and Europe 
at the same time and in the same way.”30 Ciampi first acknowledged the strong “love” of 
city or region by Italian citizens, and he essentially implored his fellow citizens to extend 
such love to the “motherland” as well as Europe. Ciampi’s statement, however, was also 
reflective of the Italian national preference for theatrics over reality.31 If Tuscany went to 
war with Liguria or European armies invaded Italy, would he truly be neutral? When 
conflict arises, regional or national affiliations will likely take precedence not only for 
Ciampi but also for the majority of Italians. 
Studies also suggest that many Italians do not share Ciampi’s European identity. 
Eurobarometer surveys indicate that Italians feel less European than most other EU 
citizens and that sentiments of Europeanism in Italy have grown weaker since the 
inception of the EU in 1993.32 Serricchio asserts that Italians have historically been “the 
most pro-European of the continent’s citizens” but “seem to have changed their attitudes 
                                                 
28 Serricchio, “Italian Citizens and Europe,” 127. 
29 Judt, Grand Illusion, 118. 
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York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), 89. 
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towards the supranational system of institutions.”33 In the Spring 2015 Eurobarometer, 
only 53% of Italians identified themselves as EU citizens—well below the EU average of 
67%.34 Only Greece, Bulgaria, and Cyprus displayed less European identity, and all three 
were within a few percentage points of Italy.35  
Barber asserted in April 2015 that Italy is one of several EU countries where 
“populist political tide is on the retreat.”36 Barber adds that “Renzi…looks like a man 
tackling Italy’s constitutional and economic challenges with an energy and sincerity 
untypical of the establishment.”37 All three noted Eurosceptic parties, however, retain 
significant support among Italian voters. In the tumultuous Italian political environment, 
moreover, change appears to be the only constant. Radical departures from current Italian 
policy positions will thus remain a real possibility for the foreseeable future regardless of 
the current ebb or flow of populist sentiment. 
The most radical platform belongs to the Northern League (LN). The League has 
gained the most support since the 2013 election (relative to the other Italian parties) 
thanks to its strong anti-immigration stance in the context of the European immigration 
crisis. As a result, the LN has jumped from a near-afterthought in Italian politics to 
polling neck-and-neck with Berlusconi’s Forza Italia for right-wing supremacy. The 
League’s creation of Padania is a reinterpretation of the Po River Valley that 
romanticizes the qualities of Northern Italy and simultaneously disparages those of the 
South. The party, believing the South is a drain on the resources of the industrious and 
prosperous North, advocates reinforcement of the North–South divide through greater 
northern autonomy or even secession.  
The Five Star Movement and Forza Italia platforms take a more passive approach 
to nationalism than does the LN. An ardent eurocritical approach implies that national 
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alternatives present a superior solution, although neither party actively promotes a strong 
nationalist agenda. The Five Star Movement burst on the scene in 2013, claiming 26% of 
the vote in that year’s parliamentary elections. The movement created deadlock in 
attempts to make majority decisions by refusing to align with either the right or left and 
thus introduced chaos into the Italian political system not seen since the Mani Pulite—
clean hands—scandal of the early 1990s. Continued support for M5S indicates that it is 
more than just a passing fad; rather, it has become a fixture in Italian politics. Compared 
to M5S, Forza Italia is a more mainstream center-right party. It has largely been led by 
Berlusconi since he entered politics in 1994, although the party has been anything but 
stable since its inception. Center-right parties have split, reconsolidated, and changed 
names in the process multiple times since 1994; such volatility further increases the 
possibility that the party will stray from traditional positions and become increasingly 
eurosceptic.  
A. HISTORY OF ITALIAN NATIONALISM AND EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION 
European unity and Italian nationalism trace their roots back to the nineteenth 
century. Napoleon Bonaparte envisioned Europe “united under a single national 
sovereign.”38 Napoleon’s campaigns, however, would ignite the spark of nationalism 
within European populations and thus achieve the opposite effect in the long term.39 The 
1814–15 Congress of Vienna officially divided Italy into independent states, some of 
which were subject to foreign rule. Northern Italy (minus Piedmont) was divided between 
Austrian rule and independent Habsburg duchies, the Kingdom of Piedmont remained 
under the House of Savoy and gained the Republic of Genoa, the Papal states were 
restored to the Pope, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (that is, Naples and Sicily) 
came under French and later Spanish Bourbon rule.40 
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The Risorgimento, or resurgence, that began in the early 1800s eventually 
culminated in the complete unification of Italian lands under the crown of Piedmont in 
1870.41 Camillo di Cavour—the forceful unifier of the Italian Peninsula—had initially 
only envisioned exploiting Italian national sentiment to promote the territorial expansion 
of Piedmont.42 Martin Wight writes that Cavour “wanted simply to make Italy 
independent of Austrian control, and as late as 1856 he dismissed the idea of Italian unity 
as sheer nonsense. Italian unification as it was actually achieved in 1859–60 was a 
triumph of opportunism.”43 Robert Gildea confirms that “there is nothing to suggest that 
in the spring of 1860 Cavour envisaged uniting the whole peninsula of Italy, but 
once…[Giuseppe] Garibaldi had seized the initiative…Cavour was forced to act.”44 
Italy was highly bipolar during the 50-year process of unification—Northern 
kingdoms were the first to join Piedmont after Cavour’s defeat of Austria while Giuseppe 
Garibaldi simultaneously brought in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in the south. 
Garibaldi’s unification of southern Italy from Sicily to Naples was a movement of the 
common people opposed to the traditional monarchy.45 Gildea adds that “as Garibaldi’s 
success grew, so did the threat to the Piedmontese monarchy.”46  
Unification was not a peaceful process, and in the end the south would draw the 
short end of the stick. After Garibaldi was forced into retreat by counter-attacking 
Bourbons, Piedmont successfully coerced the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies into 
annexation.47 The Papal state of Rome was stuck between the two poles during the 
1860s; it was left powerless to resist after the French garrison departed in 1870 and, with 
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the exception of the Holy See, joined Italy shortly thereafter to complete unification. 
Wight goes as far as to say that the process of Italian unification was “indistinguishable 
from war”:  
Garibaldi’s invasion of Sicily in 1860 with an army of volunteers, 
Cavour’s manufacture of a “spontaneous” incident in the Papal States, and 
the subsequent Piedmontese invasion and annexation of the Papal and 
Neapolitan dominions, were perhaps the supreme example of offensive 
intervention in time of peace, and were indistinguishable from war in all 
but diplomatic forms.48 
Cavour’s methods, however, were generally condoned across Europe because liberal 
ideas supported Italian unification.49 
Italy bolstered its claim to great power status by joining the Triple Alliance with 
Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1882. Alliance members promised to come to each 
other’s aid if any member was attacked by a great power, de facto solidifying Italy’s 
place in the realm of great European powers. Because of this treaty Austria-Hungary may 
have assumed that it would have the support of both Germany and Italy at the outset of 
World War I in 1914, but Italy withdrew its support and the Triple Alliance came to an 
abrupt end. Publicly Italy declared that Austria-Hungary was the aggressor and therefore 
Italy was not obligated to intervene under a Triple Alliance agreement that was solely 
defensive. A better explanation for Italy’s defection, however, was that it had territorial 
ambitions of its own. Italy coveted redemption of terra irridenta—unredeemed 
territories—surrounding Italy which had significant populations of ethnic Italians or 
Italian-speakers.50 Priority areas to the north and east were under Austro-Hungarian 
control at the time, so Italy was unlikely to gain the desired possessions by sticking with 
the Triple Alliance. Italy negotiated privately for territory with each side, although the 
Triple Entente—Britain, France, and Russia—would clearly offer more of the desired 
territory. The London Pact, finally signed in April 1915, promised Italy most of the 
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desired Austro-Hungarian territory in exchange for joining the Allies.51 Italy annexed the 
promised areas following the Allied victory; three of those areas remain part of the Italian 
state today: South Tyrol, Trentino, and eastern portions of Fruili which include Trieste. 
Fascism fueled by avid nationalism took previous irredentist thought to a new 
level. Fascists during the 1920s and 1930s would seek further annexation of 
“unredeemed” territories and colonial spazio vitale—vital space—to Italy under the 
premise that Italy’s spiritual and cultural superiority should be recognized by others.52 In 
a 1921 speech, Mussolini proclaimed, “Fascism was born...out of a profound, perennial 
need of this our Aryan and Mediterranean race.”53 Mussolini explicitly rejected any 
belief that the “Aryan” or “Mediterranean” race was biologically superior.54 Rather, he 
asserted the superiority of Italian spiritual and cultural foundations while arguing that the 
spiritual and cultural composition of a population determines its social hierarchy.55 Thus, 
Italianità could and should be assumed by others. The spazio vitale concept of Italian 
fascists was similar to Nazi Lebensraum in that both encouraged aggressive territorial 
expansion to meet the spatial needs of a supposedly superior society; the key difference, 
however, was that spazio vitale mandated cultural assimilation vice genocide. 
As an ideological consequence, Fascist Italy made land claims on Dalmatia and 
justified an Italian sphere of influence in the Balkans based upon Italy’s spiritual and 
cultural influence.56 The fascists also demonstrated imperialist ambitions, fighting to gain 
spazio vitale in Ethiopia and other parts of Africa.57 Mussolini’s deliberate defiance of 
the League of Nations during the 1935–1936 invasion of Ethiopia significantly 
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compromised international order and undermined the credibility of the League of 
Nations.58 Nazi Germany’s support for the invasion also served to align the two nations 
against other European powers.59 When Germany’s defeat of France appeared imminent 
in 1940, the expansion-minded Italy seized part of France and joined the Axis powers in 
World War II. Barzini describes the atmosphere imposed by the Mussolini regime and the 
outcome it would eventually produce: 
The regime had created an imaginary Spartan country, in which all men 
had to make believe they were heroic soldiers, all women Roman matrons, 
all children Balilla (the Genoa street urchin who started a revolt against 
the Austrian garrison in 1746 by throwing one stone). This was done by 
means of slogans, flags, stirring speeches from balconies, military music, 
mass meetings, parades, dashing uniforms, medals, hoaxes, and constant 
distortions of reality. The Italians woke up too late from their artificial 
dream…governed as in the past by contemptuous foreigners in a country 
of smoking ruins and decaying corpses.60 
Italy ousted Mussolini in 1943 and restored diplomatic relations with the Allies by 
joining the war effort against Germany, but a relationship of full trust could not be 
restored so quickly. Italy ambitiously pursued European integration through inclusion in 
cooperative Western organizations following the disastrous war, yet the Allies 
understandably questioned Italy’s reliability as a partner. Italy had switched sides during 
both World Wars. Leopoldo Nuti adds that “France and Britain…would not soon forget 
the ‘stab in the back’ of 1940.”61 Nuti describes the impact of World War II on post-war 
Italian diplomacy as follows: 
The armistice between Italy and the Allied powers…is of fundamental 
importance to any understanding of postwar Italian politics…The 1943 
disaster left Italy a weakened power, totally isolated in a hostile and 
resentful environment. This, for a country that since its inception had 
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suffered from a severe inferiority complex…and that had made the pursuit 
of parity the hallmark of its foreign policy, was the worst of all possible 
worlds. The ramshackle Italian state…was constantly striving to reassert 
itself as a normal member of the international community.62 
Italy nonetheless overcame the lingering distrust to achieve inclusion in the 
founding membership of NATO in 1949. From there, Italy and five other West European 
countries—Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany—would 
integrate further through the formation of the ECSC, the Messina Conference of 1955, 
and the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC)—the 
predecessor to the EU—in 1957.63 The founding members of the ECSC and EEC became 
known as the “inner six” because of their commitment to supranational European 
integration. Seven others (the “outer seven”)—Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom—were unwilling to commit to 
supranational European integration at the time and instead formed the less-integrated 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA).64 Ironically, five of the outer seven countries 
would eventually join the European Communities (EC) or EU. 
Italy’s avid support for European integration in the decades following World War 
II was driven not only by a desire to regain the trust of fellow NATO and EC members 
but also partly as a deliberate counter to Eastern influence. As the Cold War escalated in 
the years following World War II, Soviet Communism influenced Italy from afar, while a 
border with Yugoslavia and the West’s largest Communist party in Italy brought Eastern 
                                                 
62 Nuti, “The Richest and Farthest Master, 178. 
63 “The European Communities,” Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe, last modified 
September 11, 2012, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_european_communities-en-3940ef1d-7c10-4d0f-97fc-
0cf1e86a32d4.html; “The Messina Conference,” Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe, last 
modified September 12, 2012, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/the_messina_conference-en-b985ab83-ceb9-495a-
a408-865563de790c.html; Act of 30 November 1957 approving the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community and its Annexes and Additional Protocols and Convention, signed at Rome on 25 
March 1957, and at Brussels on 17 April 1957, Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe, accessed 
March 5, 2015, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/act_ratifying_the_eec_treaty_in_luxembourg_30_november_1957-
en-25f65dd3-2f68-43f3-903d-279d39f1de9d.html. 
64 “The European Communities.” 
 17 
influence much closer to home.65 (Yugoslavia’s Communist regime was not directly 
aligned with that of the Soviet Union and thus had a unique influence.) Italy routinely 
reaffirmed and demonstrated its commitment to NATO to compensate for the Eastern 
influences but also generally refrained from taking autonomous action on issues that 
could affect the East-West conflict.66 Osvaldo Croci adds that Italy “traded some 
sovereignty for security by de facto relinquishing…diplomacy and force to the 
Atlantic alliance.”67 Serricchio is careful to caveat “the stereotype of Italians as 
Euroenthusiasts” by noting that it was “established in…[a] context…where European 
membership was seen as a choice that reinforced Italy’s pro-Atlantic, anti-Soviet 
position.”68  
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty established EU political and economic components, 
and participating members transitioned to a common currency in 1999. Italy supported 
EU development with great enthusiasm, believing that a better Italy and a better Europe 
would be achieved through enhanced cooperation. In September 1999, Romano Prodi, 
who served as Prime Minister in 1996–1998 and 2006–2008, summarized his vision: 
The destiny of Italy is now finally fully integrated within a project of a 
more united Europe, closer to its citizens and more prestigious in the 
world. Europe will be able to do a lot to help Italy…but Europe also needs 
a strong contribution from Italy. Without Italy, in fact, there is no Europe. 
There must be a contribution of trust and full participation in the European 
idea.69 
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B. THE NORTHERN LEAGUE 
The populist Northern League has long maintained highly controversial positions 
promoting nationalist and regionalist agendas.70 According to Anna Cento Bull and Mark 
Gilbert, “The North—Italy’s productive heartland—has become alarmed and angry about 
the inadequacy of the Italian state…The Lega Nord exists because there is a Northern 
Question.”71 After the Northern League was founded in 1991 as a consolidation of 
several regional parties, it quickly gained international notoriety for its pronounced anti-
southern views. The League is Italy’s oldest standing political party and played a large 
part in bringing down the Italian First Republic during the Mani Pulite scandal. Cento 
Bull and Gilbert assert that the League “has managed to affirm itself as a permanent 
political force within the tangled Italian party system.”72 As a populist party pitting the 
people against the elites, the league has identified three supposed enemies of northern 
Italians: southern Italians, the EU, and immigrants—especially Islamic immigrants.73 
The full party name is the Lega Nord per l’Indipendenza della Padania—the 
Northern League for the Independence of Padania. The party campaigns for greater 
autonomy for Italy’s northern regions, which the party collectively refers to as Padania. 
League propaganda and speeches, as described by Tambini, have contrasted “a 
supposedly modern, developed, efficient, transparent, hardworking, and democratic 
North and a Byzantine, inefficient, occult, lazy, corrupt South.”74 More extreme party 
members have advocated outright secession to achieve independence from the economic 
burden of the south, although that position has neither been unanimously accepted among 
members nor officially established as party doctrine. The secessionist position, however, 
became highly popular within the league when it started promoting the formation of a 
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new state known as Padania in 1996.75 The League’s intellectuals offered strong cases 
that Padanian nationhood was a natural fit for the northern regions which shared ethnic, 
linguistic, cultural, and geographic similarities.76 Cento Bull and Gilbert add, 
“Instead…of promoting a Catalan or Scottish style solution to the dilemma posed by 
northern demands for greater autonomy from the central Italian state, the Lega had opted 
for the Czechoslovakian solution”—that is, a complete split by one state into two.77 
The term Padania was coined in the 1970s as a socioeconomic grouping of the 
regions of the Po Valley. Beyond the Po Valley, northern terrain is diverse. The Northern 
League, needing a term to describe its sphere of influence, adopted the name Padania to 
describe its theoretical new state during the 1990s. The League’s reinvention of Padania 
attempted to inspire artificial notions of common history and culture that simply had no 
basis in fact. Cento Bull and Gilbert note additional “folkloristic aspects of the Lega’s 
political style: flags, mass rallies, [and] the use of regional dialects.”78 
The exact boundaries of Padania are debatable, and conflicting definitions have 
been advanced. A strictly geographic definition—shown in Figure 1—would exclude 
large portions of most northern regions. The Northern League’s sphere of influence, 
however, spans from the Central Apennine Mountains of central Italy to the international 
borders in the north. The League’s 1996 Declaration of Independence and Sovereignty of 
Padania addressed 11 regions: the Aosta Valley, Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, 
Liguria, Lombardy, Le Marche, Piedmont, Tuscany, Trentino-South Tyrol, Umbria, and 
Veneto.79 This declaration contains perhaps the most inclusive definition; other sources 
often exclude the three fringe regions of Marche, Tuscany, and Umbria. Figures 2, 3, and 
4 demonstrate possible interpretations of Padania as a land consisting of 8, 9, or 11 
regions. One certainty, however, is that Padania does not extend as far south as Rome; 
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Cento Bull and Gilbert note that the League has “identified ‘Rome’…as the root of the 
Italian malaise.”80 Figure 5 summarizes the interpretations of Padania: 8 northern regions 
are definitely part of the Lega Nord’s Padania, 3 central regions are debatable, and the 
regions further south are definitely not Padanian. The League also ironically states that it 
has established representatives in Abruzzo, Lazio (the capital of which is Rome), and 
Sardinia—even though these three regions are not included in the League’s statute and 
would generally be subject to the League’s anti-South rhetoric. 
Figure 1.  Geographical Padania—The Area of the Po River Valley 
 
Source: Wikipedia, s.v. “Po Valley,”  accessed June 4, 2015, http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Po_Valley. 
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Figure 2.  Padania Interpretation of 8 Regions (Marche, Tuscany, Umbria 
Excluded) 
 
Generated with Tableau Software 
Figure 3.  Padania Interpretation of 10 Regions (Umbria excluded) 
 




















Figure 4.  Padania of 11 Regions from the Northern League Declaration 
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Figure 5.  Summary of Regions that Are, May Be, or Are Not in Padania 
 
































To say that the Northern League promotes euroscepticism would be putting it 
mildly. Roberto Maroni announced in January 2012—six months prior to becoming the 
party’s new leader—that the party represents a new Europeanism rather than 
euroscepticism.81 In either case, the League is firmly opposed to Italy having any 
affiliation with the EU or the euro zone.82 The party initially favored Italy’s entry into the 
European Monetary Union, but by 2005 the party had clearly changed course.83 In an 
interview in 2005, Italy’s Minister for Reform and Northern League member Roberto 
Calderoli announced in the League’s newspaper, La Padania, the “crusade against the 
Euro and the European superstate” and added that Europe has “taken away the people’s 
identity, currency, and sovereignty, but not their common sense.”84 
Since taking over in December 2013, party leader Matteo Salvini has refrained 
from emphasizing secessionism to the extent that Umberto Bossi, the party’s founder and 
leader from 1989 to 2012, did. Instead, Salvini takes a more Europe-oriented approach—
albeit while still looking to exit the EU—than Bossi.85 Addressing the League in 2013, 
Salvini revived calls for secession from the Italian state yet largely conveyed anti-EU 
messages.86 Salvini stated in 2014 that “the Europe of today cannot be reformed…there’s 
nothing to be reformed in Brussels. It’s run by a group of people who hate the Italian 
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people and economy in particular.”87 Salvini urges people to remember when Italy still 
used the Lira and adds that, as quoted by Agence France-Presse, the high inflation rate 
showed that “people were working and consuming.”88 
The Economist asserts that the new party leader has sought to “focus the League 
almost exclusively on causes dear to the European far right.”89 Salvini also quickly 
crafted a relationship with Marine Le Pen and her French far-right National Front.90 
Shortly thereafter, the two officially formed a eurosceptic alliance—the European 
Alliance for Freedom (EAF)—and together took over six percent of the vote in 2014 
European parliament elections.91 Tony Pierucci concludes that the threat posed by the 
Northern League under the domestically-focused Bossi was mostly confined to Italy, but 
that Salvini will “remain a controversial political figure…in European politics in 
general.”92 
Ironically, the League’s stringent anti-EU position may contradict the rhetoric that 
first propelled the league to international notoriety. The Northern League began as one of 
the more euroenthusiastic political parties in Italy, following the long-standing Italian 
tradition of positive sentiments toward European integration.93 The concept of Padania as 
a nation came about, in part, due to the critical importance of “Padanian” trade with EU 
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member states.94 The League, anticipating that the incumbent Italian government would 
not meet the Maastricht criteria by 1998, calculated that the powerful northern business 
elites might turn against the incumbent government—especially if the Northern League 
platform was designed to receive them.95 In this way, secessionist rhetoric perhaps 
peaked between 1996 and 1998 as an indirect result of a pro-EU approach.96 
The League, much like other far right parties in Europe, advocates a hard or even 
xenophobic stance against immigration.97 The party has been at the forefront of the anti-
immigration rhetoric that has spread across Italy and Europe alike in recent years. During 
its infancy stages, the League was even opposed to migration of southern Italians to the 
north, since southerners were still culturally different—perhaps even “foreign” in 
northern eyes—and were seen (perhaps unfairly) as representing an economic burden.98 
During the course of the 1990s, the northern view of southerners as immigrants faded as 
attention shifted to the impact of Islamic immigrants.99 The 2002 Bossi-Fini Act—
sponsored by right-wing parties with strong influence from Northern League—
significantly tightened immigration controls. The bill’s authors sought to criminalize 
illegal immigration; the measure was removed from the bill to appease the majority, but it 
paved the way for illegal immigration to officially be criminalized in 2009.100 In 2006 
the League introduced another bill that would require aspiring citizens to pass language, 
culture, history, and institutional exams to gain citizenship.101 The League argues such 
measures would ensure that aspiring citizens will smoothly transition to life in Italy, 
although opponents note that such measures exemplify the party’s longstanding 
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opposition to a multicultural Italy.102 The League has not been able to push the stringent 
citizenship legislation through parliament to date—in part due to the traditionally 
inclusive stance of Catholicism—but such legislation remains a very real possibility in an 
environment of growing concern regarding immigration.103 
Islamic immigrants in particular have received great scrutiny from the League. 
League parliamentarian Federico Bricolo declared in 2006 that Italy must “close the 
doors to those coming from the Muslim countries;…with these [people] we must use the 
iron fist.”104 Amidst unrest in Denmark that same year stemming from cartoons of 
Mohammed, the League proclaimed that it was the first to warn fellow Europeans of the 
dangers of Islam.105 In the same breath, the League implied that politicians must now 
listen to what had previously fallen on deaf ears.106 The Charlie Hebdo attack in France 
in January 2015 perhaps served to validate the League’s position in many European 
voters’ minds; the League has not changed its position since the attack, yet has seen its 
popularity increase recently thanks in part to its pronounced anti-immigration views.  
After Bossi was replaced in 2012, Gianfranco Pasquino and Marco Valbruzzi 
asserted that the Northern League was on the decline.107 The League’s popularity peaked 
at 10.1% of the popular vote in the 1996 general elections, and the party mustered only 
4.1% of the vote in the 2013 general elections. Resurgence is always a possibility in the 
tumultuous Italian political environment, however, and the Northern League is again 
gaining steam. Many potential Forza Italia voters desire a more vigorous approach such 
as that of the Northern League, and regional election results in November 2014 led The 
Economist to assert that “the Northern League could overtake Forza Italia as Italy’s right-
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wing party.”108 The April 2015 Termometro Politico opinion poll estimated that the Lega 
Nord would receive 15 percent of the national vote, the highest among right-wing parties 
and a dramatic uptick from the 2013 election.109 
C. THE FIVE STAR MOVEMENT 
Renzi’s stiffest political competitor may be the anti-euro zone (and somewhat 
anti-NATO) Five Star Movement, which burst on the scene in the 2013 parliamentary 
election to claim 26 percent of the vote – the same as Renzi’s Democratic Party (PD).110 
Barber notes, however, that the M5S is “slipping in opinion polls because…Grillo seems 
a protester obsessed with the purity of his party’s principles rather than getting something 
done.”111 Eric Turner agrees with Barber that “support [for Grillo’s movement] may be 
on the decline,” but he also adds that M5S “is still a very salient political force.”112 The 
Economist noted that the movement “performed miserably in [2014] regional 
elections.”113 Protest movements such as M5S draw significant support from citizens 
who would not ordinarily vote, however, so high abstention rates during the election 
leave a large amount of likely support for M5S unaccounted for.114 In November 2015 
the Datamedia Ricerche opinion poll estimated that M5S would receive 27 percent of the 
national vote, confirming that the movement remains a strong contender to overtake 
Renzi and the PD.115 James Politi of the Financial Times further asserts that the M5S is 
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taking calculated measures to transform its image from “one of Europe’s most 
eccentric—even clownish—political parties” into one that is ready “to govern the 
country.”116 
The Movement lacks a strong nationalist flair like that of the Northern League or 
an affiliation with either the left or right, making Five Star positions somewhat less 
pronounced. Grillo insists that the official stances of the populist movement accurately 
represent the people; online referendums such as the vote to ally with the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) exemplify how the party incorporates the voice of the 
people.117 The party has made clear, however, its opposition to the euro. Grillo, who 
doubles as a comedian and a politician, launched a tour in 2014 entitled “Te la do io 
l’Europa”—“Here you are, this is Europe.”118 Grillo’s message, according to the party’s 
official website, vehemently condemns participation in the euro zone: 
A monster is haunting Europe. It is called the euro. Those who have met it 
often ended in misery. Whole states have become debtors of a bank, the 
ECB [European Central Bank]. If you do not pay, instead of the mafia, the 
Troika—so much worse—comes. Political Europe has turned into a 
financial nightmare. Unknown officials are managing our lives, from the 
mortgage to the cormorant hunting.119 
Grillo has also made clear his disdain for NATO. In June 2015, Grillo scoffed at 
the proposal to support a coalition effort in Iraq with Italian Tornado aircraft and implied 
that NATO interventions constitute acts of war, adding that “Italy must review its role in 
NATO.”120 In his vision for Italy in 2042, Grillo expressed his disdain more bluntly in 
painting a utopian picture of Italy free from NATO and the euro:  
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We have become a self-sufficient nation; no one believed us! No one 
believed that we could go with perfect and natural alternative energies; 
now we have! We have wonderful public schools…[and] freedom of 
information…There is no one left behind; the poor do not know who they 
are…We exited NATO…[Italy] left these wars disguised as peacekeeping 
missions. We left the euro...and the lira is strong. The lira…has become a 
safe haven for the Swiss; the public debt has been halved.121 
Grillo’s contempt for NATO is not shared by all party members, however. Luigi Di 
Maio, who some speculate is being groomed to become Grillo’s successor, stated in 
November 2015 that withdrawal from NATO is not being considered.122 
Naomi O’Leary asserts that the issue of immigration in particular “threatens to 
divide the party.”123 Two Five Star senators proposed reforms to decriminalize illegal 
immigration in 2013 as the immigration crisis gained visibility, but the independent 
initiative enraged Grillo because it did not represent a party line.124 In response, Grillo 
wrote, “This amendment is an invitation to migrants from Africa and the Middle East to 
head for Italy....How many immigrants can we accommodate if one Italian in eight does 
not have money?....[The senators’] position…wasn’t part of the program voted for by 8.5 
million.”125 The Movement thus leans toward the right regarding illegal immigration, but 
is neither as extreme nor as vocal as the Northern League. 
Although the Five Star Movement agrees with the Northern League that Italy 
should exit the euro zone and regain some degree of national autonomy, the agreement 
between the two parties stops there. The Five Star Movement blames both left and right 
that Italy is still within the euro zone, and it promises to be the party most intent on 
changing that. M5S, according to the Agence France-Presse, holds the following view: 
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“On one hand the majority is led by…[Renzi’s] Democratic Party which is uninterested 
in the social butchery provoked by a common currency, and on the other Salvini criticises 
the euro but does nothing.”126 
The Five Star Movement has emphasized that leaving the euro zone does not 
necessarily mean leaving the EU.127 A lack of criticism for the EU as a whole, however, 
must not be interpreted as support for the EU. On the contrary, the movement’s 
fundamental anti-establishment premise would hinder support for supranational 
establishments. Within the European Parliament, M5S formed an alliance with the anti-
EU UKIP in 2014.128 Some party members feared that the alliance with UKIP would 
harm the way the M5S is perceived—especially because of the perceived xenophobia of 
UKIP—yet the overwhelming majority of voting M5S members, 78%, opted in favor of 
the alliance.129 
D. FORZA ITALIA 
Forza Italia has thus far refrained from explicitly advocating withdrawal from the 
euro zone, although the party has made it clear that its support for the euro is limited. 
Berlusconi said that the party’s voters are “split exactly down the middle” and described 
his position as “yes to the euro, but only under certain well-defined conditions.”130 Forza 
Italia, in other words, seeks euro reform rather than absolute withdrawal. Armellini adds 
that Berlusconi has “courted eurosceptic opinion” with his resistance to German-inspired 
austerity policies—many of which he approved while in office.131 On a personal level, 
                                                 
126 Agence France-Presse, “Two Italian parties call for exit from Eurozone.” 
127 “Italians May Vote to Leave Eurozone in 2015 Referendum: Five Star Movement,” Global 
Research News, November 28, 2014, http://www.globalresearch.ca/italians-may-vote-to-leave-eurozone-in-
2015-referendum-five-star-movement/5416733. 
128 “Italy’s Five Star Chooses UKIP for Party Alliance,” Euronews, June 13, 2014, 
http://www.euronews.com/2014/06/13/italy-sfive-starchoosesukipforeuropeanparliamentalliance/. 
129 Ibid.; Lorenzo del Savio and Matteo Mameli, “Anti-Representative Democracy: How to 
Understand the Five Star Movement,” Open Democracy, July 4, 2014, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/lorenzo-del-savio-matteo-mameli/antirepresentative-
democracy-how-to-understand-fi. 
130 Berlusconi quoted in Armellini, “Anti-Euro Talk Spreads in Italy.” 
131 Ibid. 
 31 
Berlusconi claimed that a plot by EU officials ultimately forced him out of office in 
2011.132 It is therefore plausible that Berlusconi and at least some members of his party 
would harbor anti-EU sentiment. 
Eleanora Poli and Mark Valentiner conclude that Forza Italia has “placed its 
campaign on the wave of ‘selective euroscepticism’ in order to attract as many voters as 
possible” but overall does not align with the anti-euro or anti-EU visions of the Five Star 
Movement or the Northern League.133 Poli and Valentiner add that Forza Italia “is not 
eurosceptic per se, it is rather opportunistic as its campaign was…based on populist 
rhetoric in highlighting the need for Italy to pursue its self-interests.”134 This judgment is 
supported by the decision of Forza Italia to align with mainstream pro-European parties 
in the European Parliament.135 
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III. FACTORS PROMOTING NATIONALISM OR 
EUROSCEPTICISM IN ITALY 
Statistical analysis indicates that an Italian’s confidence in national political 
institutions has a positive correlation (albeit small) with European identity.136 A legacy 
of political failures in Italy, however, has inspired more doubt than confidence. 
Europeanism in Italy thus faces stiff challenges.  
A tumultuous history and political environment foster nationalism or 
euroscepticism in a variety of ways. Six additional factors are discussed in this chapter. 
First, the diverse regional history and northern dominance during and after Italy’s 
coerced unification laid the foundation for strong regional divides and persisting loyalties 
to localities over the national state. Second, a history of unpredictability and inefficiency 
within the Italian political system has shaped the complex Italian national character into 
one which generally loathes mainstream politics, distrusts state institutions, and is 
susceptible to being swayed by radical agendas. Third, the historical distrust of 
governmental institutions has been exacerbated by the global financial crisis of 2008 and 
continuing economic stagnation. Fourth, the presence of the West’s largest Communist 
party during the Cold War and the Russia-friendly Berlusconi era have served to further a 
strong Italy-Russia relationship which in some circumstances undermines Italian support 
for the key Euro-Atlantic institutions, NATO and the EU. Fifth, the expansion of both the 
EU and NATO threatens to increase the risks or reduce the national benefits of 
membership. Lastly, the Northern League has capitalized upon the Mediterranean 
immigration crisis to further its xenophobic agenda and fuel a new wave of nationalism in 
Italy.  
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A. A TUMULTUOUS HISTORY AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
1. Pre-Unification History and Unification 
Two thousand years ago, Rome presided over one of the greatest empires and 
most powerful religions on earth. As Stefan Collignon points out, “at the beginning of 
Europe, there was Italy. Ancient Rome copied Greek culture, but politically the Roman 
Empire dominated the Mediterranean universe and set the agenda for future empires.”137 
The Roman Catholic church maintained great influence over the centuries, although the 
Italian peninsula would remain divided into city-states and territories until the latter half 
of the 19th century. Hosts of foreign invaders, including Ostrogoths, Byzantines, 
Lombards, and Franks, came and went. Strong maritime republics such as Genoa, Pisa, 
Venice, and Amalfi would emerge along key trade routes, and by the 15th century the 
Italian peninsula had become a mixture of warring city-states in the north—namely 
Florence, Milan, and Venice; central Papal states; and the Kingdom of Sicily to the south. 
Some Italian states remained under foreign rule up until unification, and even after 
unification the South essentially remained subject to the rule of the North.138 
The legacy of the Roman Empire, foreign invasions, powerful city-states, and 
bipolar unification have hardly faded over the years. The historic greatness of Rome 
reinforces the notion that Italy belongs among the world’s great powers. Skepticism 
about Italy’s European neighbors is reinforced by the invasions of centuries past while 
immaculate preservation of the majestic city-states fosters regional pride and rivalry. The 
striking divide between north and south in contemporary Italy also traces its roots as far 
back as the twelfth century and would be reinforced by the polarization that occurred 
during the Risorgimento.139 
Scholarly studies confirm that enduring divides between northern and southern 
Italy originated in the Middle Ages. Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work, 
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published in 1993, concludes that social capital has persistently been unevenly distributed 
across the Italian regions.140 Putnam writes, “Nearly a millennium ago, two contrasting 
and innovative regimes were established in different parts of Italy—a powerful monarchy 
in the South and a remarkable set of communal republics in the center and north.”141 The 
resulting regional variances, according to Putnam, “in civic involvement and social 
solidarity…have decisive consequences for the quality of life, public and private, in 
Italy’s regions today.”142 Putnam dates the “start of the Italy’s civic split between North 
and South” to around 1100 and notes that “the regions characterized by civic involvement 
in the late twentieth century are almost precisely the same regions…where neighborhood 
associations and religious confraternities and guilds had contributed to the flourishing 
communal republics of the twelfth century.”143 Over the centuries uneven distribution of 
social capital has enabled northern Italy to develop more rapidly than southern Italy.144 
Rigorous statistical analysis by Guido de Blasio and Giorgio Nuzzo augment Putnam’s 
work; de Blasio and Nuzzo conclude that historical inequalities have led to variations 
between north and south which are evident today across a range of “econometric 
checks.”145 
Unification also represented modern Italy’s first notable struggle between 
political ideologies. The authoritarian Cavour had utilized a powerful alliance with 
Napoleon III of France to unite northern Italy under the House of Savoy. Garibaldi’s 
unification of southern Italy, on the other hand, was to some extent a movement of the 
common people opposed to the traditional Bourbon monarchy. Garibaldi had been 
inspired by Giuseppe Mazzini’s revolutionary vision of an Italian democracy, which 
Wight sums up: “If one could purify the hearts of the people and teach them of their 
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sacred national cause, then they would spontaneously arise, and their oppressors, the 
Austrian and the Italian, would flee, and the nation be free.”146 After the northerners 
triumphed, King Victor Emmanuel II became not only the last king of Piedmont but also 
the first king of united Italy. Even after the national capital moved south from Turin to 
Florence (1865) and on to Rome (1871), national matters remained disproportionately 
dominated by Piedmontese interests.147 The rulers of Piedmont—highly influenced by 
Prussian Machtpolitik, or power politics—saw no alternative to heavy-handed rule for 
what they regarded as the ungovernable and corrupt South.148 In this way the polarization 
of the pre-unification years was further reinforced such that the North–South divide 
would remain a lasting legacy. 
2. Post-Unification History through World War II 
Francesco Saverio Nitti, when asked by Luigi Barzini to sum up Italian history 
from the Risorgimento through the Second World War, remarked, “Gli italiani sono stati 
ubbriacati di bugie per cento cinquanta anni”—“the Italians have been made drunk with 
lies for one hundred and fifty years.”149 In Barzini’s interpretation, the lies began with 
the “grandiose expectations aroused by the Risorgimento, which…was supposed to cure 
all Italian ills, solve all problems, produce wealth, spread literacy, transform all the 
people into democratic and well-behaved North Europeans, and open the road to national 
greatness and prosperity.”150 According to Barzini, “United Italy turned out not to be 
exactly what many people had imagined…The final result was a rickety, divided, shabby, 
impoverished and backward nation, yet one that wasted its miserable resources trying to 
impersonate one of the world’s great powers.”151 
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The influence of Machtpolitik upon the House of Savoy’s rule during the late 
1800s not only reinforced polarization between North and South but also left a permanent 
scar on Italian politics. Machtpolitik introduced incurable ills into a political system 
which believed that force, not consent, should be the foundation of the state.152 
Alexander Passerin d’Entrèves argues that, as a consequence, “a kind of cheap, second-
rate Machiavellianism is still ingrained in the mind of many Italians” and that it is 
manifested as a tendency to “emphasize the seamy side of political life, as if self-interest 
were its only determining factor.”153 According to d’Entrèves, Italians thus maintain a 
“pessimistic or…cynical view of the state, based on the assumption that politics is a 
matter of getting the upper hand and that all men, if not potential criminals, are at any 
rate would-be profiteers or tax-evaders.”154 
Perhaps the biggest lie came in the form of Fascist propaganda during the years 
following World War I.155 Italy had gained former Austro-Hungarian territories as a 
World War I victor, yet Fascists aggressively sought further annexation of “unredeemed” 
territories by Italy and dreamed of a grand Italian empire.156 Wight describes the 1935–
36 conquest of Abyssinia as a “desperate act of self-assertion” seeking to cement 
Italy’s place among the great powers; today that conquest is regarded as an object of 
shame due to the horrendous atrocities committed and the fact that it was based on 
aggression.157 Popular support for Mussolini crumbled after the Allied invasion of Sicily 
and air raids on Rome left Italy on the brink of defeat in World War II. The Grand 
Council of Fascism voted to transfer a great deal of power from Mussolini to King Victor 
Emmanuel III on July 25, 1943; the next day Mussolini was removed from office and 
imprisoned. The king subsequently appointed General Pietro Badoglio as the new Prime 
Minister. 
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Fascist totalitarianism achieved temporary political stability through grandiose 
promises during the 1920s and 1930s, but the Mussolini regime ultimately ended in great 
disappointment. Disenchantment and guilt enduring from the fascist era only served to 
further undermine long-term stability in Italian politics. A historical detachment of the 
population from politics, however, has arguably led to less collective guilt among Italians 
relative to their German counterparts. 
3. Post-World War II History 
The centrist Christian Democracy (DC) emerged as the dominant party within the 
Italian Republic following the 1946 referendum that abolished the monarchy. Opposing 
parties—the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI)—were 
excluded from government largely due to U.S. influence. As Italy gradually modernized 
in the 1950s, however, a growing industrial working class, especially in the northwestern 
regions, resulted in an increasingly left-leaning population and thus a decline in popular 
support for the DC. The PSI was allowed to enter government in 1963 as the DC looked 
to counter surging PCI popularity. The center-left coalition government had great 
ambitions for reform, but Barzini describes how this plan fell short of enthusiasts’ lofty 
expectations: 
They thought it [the plan] was the only way to cure all the Italian ills at 
once…It would strengthen the decaying state; check rampant corruption; 
generally enforce law and order; defeat the Mafia, the Camorra, and the 
emboldened unattached criminals; discourage the class struggle; 
decrease…ruinous strikes; swell production and exports; slow down 
inflation; levitate the standard of living; and as a result, encourage 
domestic and foreign investments…The plan might possibly have 
produced in some other country all the wonderful effects…expected. In 
unpredictable Italy it produced the exact contrary. It was estimated that in 
the end the plan cost as much as a lost war and retarded social and 
economic progress for at least one generation.158 
What began as a promising step forward again ended as another one of Italian history’s 
great lies. 
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The PCI continued to gain momentum as the Cold War raged on. The party 
became the West’s largest Communist party during the 1960s and would remain so up 
until the end of the Cold War. By the mid-1970s it appeared that the PCI would 
potentially overtake the DC at the center of the Italian government.159 The DC narrowly 
won the 1976 election and was prepared to cede power in the parliamentary majority to 
the PCI.160 Mark Gilbert claims that the Americans were “adamant that the PCI should 
not be trusted with executive power,” so the ensuing “historic compromise” limited the 
PCI to providing parliamentary support instead of ministers.161 Gilbert asserts that the 
historic compromise is “relevant to contemporary Italian politics because it enabled the 
DC to defeat Red Brigade terrorism and survive the economic crisis of the 1970s without 
implementing major structural reforms to the country’s economy and institutions, reforms 
that, even then, were badly needed. Italy continues to pay the price for this missed 
opportunity.”162 
Governments of the Italian Republic throughout the Cold War may have lacked 
effectiveness but had at least been relatively stable.163 The political system was highly 
polarized by the presence of the extreme right neo-fascists and the extreme left PCI. 
Gianfranco Pasquino and Marco Valbruzzi assert that “neither the left-wing pole nor the 
right-wing pole was ever in a position significantly or credibly to challenge the governing 
parties and their coalitions located around the centre of the political alignment. Hence, 
alternation in government was neither numerically possible nor politically acceptable. In 
fact, it never took place.”164 
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4. Lasting Effects Evident in the Contemporary Environment 
Between 1992 and 1994, the Mani Pulite corruption scandal effectively dissolved 
the prominent longstanding political parties, including the DC and PSI, and ushered in a 
new phase of politics in the Italian Republic.165 The turnover helped propel the Northern 
League from a regional movement to national prominence. Tambini asserts, “The League 
more than any other party received the votes that were released by the profound crisis of 
the ruling parties.”166 Silvio Berlusconi announced his entry into politics a mere two 
months before the 1994 parliamentary elections—and was subsequently elected Prime 
Minister. Berlusconi sought to pass self-serving legislation by which he could both avoid 
personal indictment in the scandal and save his media empire, Fininvest, from the fallout 
of the crisis.167 Berlusconi confidentially explained his motivation to run for Prime 
Minister to Il Giornale editor Indro Montanelli during the 1994 campaign: “If I don’t 
enter politics, I’ll end up in jail and fall into debt.”168 (Il Giornale was and remains a part 
of the Berlusconi media empire.) Berlusconi won the election with an underwhelming 
21% of the popular vote, further indicating how fractured the political system was at the 
time.169 Michael Day adds, “That a corrupt, self-serving tycoon with little or no record of 
interest in politics or public service could buy his way to the prime ministership of one of 
the world’s biggest democracies was—and is—shocking...This phenomenon—without 
equal in modern history—bears testament…to…the peculiar social circumstances in 
which Italy found itself in the early 1990s.”170 
For the first time in the history of the Italian Republic, an alternation of power—
between Berlusconi’s center-right Forza Italia and center-left parties—became 
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possible.171 Pasquino and Valbruzzi comment, “Alternation in power started to become a 
‘credible expectation’ precisely when polarization (namely, the electoral strength of anti-
system parties) began to decrease substantially.”172 The largest anti-system party, the 
PCI, had dissolved in 1991 and its successors offered a minimal threat, yet Berlusconi 
still ran and won on a platform of defeating the communists. Even today voters are still 
swayed by anti-communist rhetoric. According to Pasquino and Valbruzzi, “The fact 
there are still millions of Italian voters who give their support to any and all varieties of 
anticommunism and anti-communist electoral propaganda is a testimony of their 
ingrained and long-standing perception of a potential systemic threat.”173 
Stability and effective governance were never truly achieved under the bicameral 
parliament in the electoral system that emerged during the 1990s.174 The prominent 
parties again took on new forms with new names during the 2000s: the center-right Forza 
Italia and Alleanza Nazionale became the People of Freedom (PdL) while the center-left 
Left Democrats and Daisy were transformed into the Democratic Party (PD). According 
to Pasquino and Valbruzzi, however, the new parties represented “an essentially not very 
satisfactory attempt to rejuvenate their organizations: old wine in partially new 
bottles.”175 The lack of stability was again evidenced in 2013 when PdL transformed into 
a second iteration of Forza Italia. A substantial number of PdL members, including 
Berlusconi’s protégé Angelino Alfano and all five PdL ministers, dissented and formed 
the Nuovo Centrodestra party instead of transitioning to Forza Italia.  
The emergence of the anti-system Five Star Movement has again disrupted the 
bicameral and electoral system and has led some to believe that Italy is once again 
entering a new phase of politics.176 In the 2008 elections, the PdL and PD combined to 
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account for over 70 percent of the popular vote share within the House of Deputies.177 In 
2013, however, the 26 percent vote share of M5S exceeded both parties:  PD was reduced 
to 25 percent and PdL could only muster 21%.178 The combined 12% of the 2013 vote 
given to Mario Monti’s new centrist party, Civic Choice (SC), and the extreme right 
Northern League must also be accounted for.179 The current Italian political environment 
will probably remain highly unstable for the foreseeable future. Pasquino and Valbruzzi 
sum up the turmoil that has defined these new political phases: 
Neither the party system nor the Constitution and institutions have attained 
a viable state of consolidation. Both…continue to be part of the problem—
the instability and ineffectiveness of all Italian governments…Party 
leaders have proved unable, and frequently even unwilling, to reform the 
party system and to revise the Constitution.180 
Gilbert describes the new Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, as “a kinetic young 
man…whose self-proclaimed mission is to rottamare (junk) the old guard in Italian 
politics and to revive the country’s institutions and economy,” but Gilbert also notes 
that “a dose of healthy scepticism about Renzi’s chances is in order.”181 
B. REGIONAL DIVIDES AND THE CONCEPT OF PADANIA 
A snapshot of mid-twentieth century Italy would reveal a highly developed 
industrial triangle of Genoa, Milan, and Turin in the Northwest; less industrialized yet 
still prosperous regions in the Center and Northeast; and a poor, agrarian South.182 
Booming levels of investment and production emerged in the Northeast in the 1960s that 
carry over to this day.183 Industrial districts began to proliferate southward in the 1980s 
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and are now commonplace, especially in the southeastern regions of Apulia, Basilicata, 
and Molise.184  
Considering how the industrial gap between regions has narrowed, is the fabled 
Padania of the Northern League entirely a myth? Or does the data validate Northern 
League depictions of an efficient, prosperous, and law-abiding North against an 
inefficient, poor, and corrupt South?185 Perceptions persist—and not just within the 
Northern League—that the South continues to economically lag behind a more 
prosperous North. Another commonly-held stereotype holds that the South is inundated 
with corruption and full of Mafiosi and tax evaders.186 Further analysis of regional GDP, 
political corruption, mafia influence, and tax evasion definitively supports the view that a 
more productive and less corrupt North is more fact than myth. 
1. Divide #1: Northerners Are Rich and Southerners Are Poor 
Examination of GDP and unemployment confirms that the North–South divide 
persists. Figure 6, produced by the European Commission’s Eurostat, compares Italian 
regions to their European counterparts. In no other European country is such a stark 
contrast evident: Northern Italy resembles the richer countries of central Europe and 
Scandinavia, while Southern Italy mostly mirrors the poorer areas on the peripheries of 
Europe.187 GDP within rich and poor nations alike appears to be much more evenly 
distributed in comparison with Italy; most Italian regions lie in the upper or lower tiers of 
GDP with very few categorized in the middle tiers.188 Figure 7 displays 2015 
unemployment figures for each region.189 Unemployment in the South is generally 
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double or triple that of the northern regions; without exception every region north of 
Rome falls below the national unemployment average of 12.2%.190 Lazio, Molise, and 
every region southward are without exception above the national average.191 The absence 
of exceptions strongly supports the judgment that Rome represents a pronounced divide 
not only geographically but also economically. 
Figure 6.  GDP of Europe by Region (2013) 
 
Adapted from Eurostat, “GDP at Regional Level,” European Commission, last modified March 25, 2015, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/GDP_at_regional_level. 
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Figure 7.  Unemployment across Italy (2015) 
 
Generated using Tableau Software. Adapted from I.Stat, “Ranking and Thematic Map of Unemployment Rate 
in Regions,” UrbiStat, accessed June 4, 2015, http://www.urbistat.it/adminstat/it/it/classifiche/tasso-
disoccupazione/regioni/italia/380/1#linknote_1_note. 
2. Divide #2: Mafia Presence and Corruption Are More Widespread in 
the South 
A stereotype associating mafia influence exclusively with the South would be 
incorrect. Among northern areas, the regions surrounding the industrial hubs of Milan 
and Turin are especially plagued by mafia presence.192 The three most recognizable 
mafia organizations, however, all hail from the southwest extremes of Italy: the Casa 
Nostra of Sicily, the Camorra of Campania, and the ‘Ndrangheta of Calabria.193 A 
number of studies have confirmed that mafia influence is exponentially higher in 
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southern regions.194 Vittorio Daniele and Ugo Marani summed “extortion and mafia-type 
association crimes per 10,000 inhabitants” from 2002 through 2005; the results shown in 
Figure 8 demonstrate striking evidence that mafia influence is uniformly stronger in 
southern regions.195 Francesco Calderoni developed a more in-depth mafia index based 
upon relevant variables determined to be statistically significant. The results, shown in 
Figure 9, are based on a cross-ranking of 103 Italian provinces (i.e., sub-regions); the 
lowest ranks indicate the least evidence of mafia influence and vice versa.196 The two 
models, largely mirroring each other, show that that Calabria, Campania, and Sicily are 
affected to a much larger extent than other regions.197 The models further demonstrate 
heavy influence in almost every province south of Rome and relatively low influence in 
“Padanian” regions.198 
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Figure 8.  Extortion and Mafia-type Association Crimes 
 
Data is per 10,000 inhabitants from 2002-2005. Source: Vittorio Daniele and Ugo 
Marani, “Organized crime, the quality of local institutions and FDI in Italy: A panel data 
analysis.” European Journal of Political Economy 27, no. 1 (2011): 132–142, quoted in 
Calderoni, “Where is the mafia in Italy?” 49. 
Figure 9.  Calderoni’s Mafia Index 
 
Lower rank means fewer indicators of mafia influence. Source: Francesco Calderoni, 
“Where Is the Mafia in Italy? Measuring the Presence of the Mafia Across Italian 
Provinces,” Global Crime 12, no. 1 (2011): 63, doi:10.1080/17440572.2011.548962. 
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Corruption is often intertwined with mafia presence. The A3 motorway along the 
west coast from Campania to the southern tip of Calabria, which began construction in 
the 1960s and remains a work in progress today, is a prime example that has drawn 
international ire. Rachel Donadio states, “Nothing embodies the failures of the Italian 
state more neatly than the highway from Salerno to Reggio Calabria…The highway is 
also a symbol of what some Northern European countries…fear the most about the euro 
zone.”199 The project has remained incomplete even after the expenditure of a substantial 
amount of EU development funds, and in 2012 Italy was ordered to repay €420 million in 
grant money following an investigation by the European Commission’s Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF)—the largest fraud-related refund in the EU’s history. OLAF head 
Giovanni Kessler blamed the Italian government for “turning a blind eye to the known 
corruption” that included “mafia infiltration as a key element.”200 Later that year, the 
Italian cabinet dissolved the entire government of Reggio—the largest city on record to 
have its government dissolved—stemming from findings of mafia infiltration.201 
A study by Miriam Golden and Lucio Picci attempting to quantify corruption in in 
Italy suggests that corruption is also a larger problem in the south than in the north. The 
study measured the difference between the existing public infrastructure and the funds 
allocated to construct that infrastructure. Golden and Picci assert that “where the 
difference between the two is larger, more money is being lost to fraud, embezzlement, 
waste, and mismanagement—in other words, corrpution is greater.”202 The study 
generated results that were nontheless surpising: the North possesses more robust 
infrastructure, but the amount of public capital invested in infrastrure is generally higher 
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in the South. Figure 10 maps the authors’ findings, where the lower scores of red areas 
correlate to lower efficiency and therefore higher corruption.203 Liguria appears to be an 
outlier at first glance, but consideration of the area’s rocky coastal terrain and thus 
disproportionatly high construction and maintenance costs are a more plausible 
explanation than corruption.204 The authors conclude, “What happened to all that money? 
Where is all of Italy’s missing infrastructure?”205 According to the authors, their 
“proposed measure of corruption provides an interpretation for this puzzle.”206 
Figure 10.  Corruption by region from study by Golden and Picci 
 
Lower index score means more corrupt. Source: Miriam A. Golden and Lucio Picci, 
“Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, Illustrated with Italian Data,” Economics & 
Politics 17, no. 1 (2005), 47, doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2005.00146.x. 
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3. Divide #3: Tax Evasion Is More Common in the South 
Northerners often point to tax evasion as another indicator of corruption in the 
South. Figure 11 displays a 2013 cover of the Northern League’s periodical, La Padania. 
The League’s figures show a clear divide between North and South. Green provinces 
representing low levels of tax evasion only appear in Rome and northwards; red 
provinces representing the highest levels of tax evasion only appear south of Rome. In 
the provinces of Campania, Calabria, and Sicily tax evasion reaches nearly 66%. Georgio 
Brosio, Alberto Cassone, and Roberto Ricciuti confirmed in 2002 that tax evasion is 
markedly higher in the South and concluded that “tax evasion is tacitly accepted in the 
poorest regions” of Italy.207 Figures 12 and 13 illustrate how tax evasion is higher in the 
South both in terms of personal income tax (PIT) and value added tax (VAT). Figure 14 
provides a full summary of the findings of Brosio and his co-authors, demonstrating that 
the regions with the lowest GDP correlate to the highest tax evasion, and vice versa.208 
Other studies identify additional factors such as age, education, or occupation but agree 
that the North–South divide is evident.209 
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Figure 11.  Tax Evasion According to La Padania 
 





Figure 12.  Personal Income Tax Evasion 
 
Generated Using Tableau Software. Adapted from Giorgio Brosio, Alberto Cassone, and 
Roberto Ricciuti, “Tax Evasion Across Italy: Rational Noncompliance or Inadequate 
Civic Concern?” Public Choice 112, no. 3/4 (2002): 270. 
Figure 13.  Value Added Tax Evasion 
 
Generated Using Tableau Software. Source: Adapted from Giorgio Brosio, Alberto 
Cassone, and Roberto Ricciuti, “Tax Evasion Across Italy: Rational Noncompliance or 
Inadequate Civic Concern?” Public Choice 112, no. 3/4 (2002): 270. 
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Figure 14.  Correlation of GDP to Tax Evasion 
 
Source: Giorgio Brosio, Alberto Cassone, and Roberto Ricciuti, “Tax Evasion Across 
Italy: Rational Noncompliance or Inadequate Civic Concern?” Public Choice 112, no. 3/4 
(2002): 270. 
In conclusion, a stark divide between North and South is a key factor contributing 
to regionalism in Italy. Padania is more than a creation of the Northern League; an 
examination of wealth, corruption, and tax evasion confirms similarities among northern 
regions and striking gaps from Rome southward. Regionalism and nationalism are not 
contradictory but rather the two are combined in the single entity of the Northern League. 
As regional divides draw voters to the party, the Northern League’s strong nationalist and 
anti-European platforms gain further momentum. 
C. THE ITALIAN NATIONAL CHARACTER 
1. Baseline of the Italian National Character  
Some may say that an Italian national character is a misnomer. There are, after all, 
more differences than similarities between the average Sicilian farmer and Milanese 
businessman. Local and regional loyalties are still predominant, and on a broader scale a 
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stark contrast clearly exists between “northern Italian” and “southern Italian” cultural 
values. There is no hard dividing line between the North and South, yet somewhere 
between Bologna and Naples the transition becomes evident. As one proceeds south, 
rules become recommendations, the chaos seems to ramp up a couple of notches, and 
stronger dialects emerge. Gaps in income and corruption have been shown to amplify the 
divide. Division, however, is not the only enduring aspect of the Italian national 
character. 
Alessandro Cavalli argues, “The difficulty in defining a national character and 
empirically observing its traces can lead us to deny its existence. And yet it is difficult to 
deny that something like a national character really does exist….One feels that 
something, besides living in a peninsula located to the south of the Alps and speaking 
variants of the same language, must in some way unite ‘Italians.’”210 Four commonly-
cited generalizations provide valuable insight into the elusive Italian national character. 
First, emphasis is placed on maintaining a bella figura, or appearance, over substance; 
theatrics are preferred over reality.211 Second, citizens place minimal trust or respect in 
political and state institutions.212 Third, tax evasion, reflecting a lack of state legitimacy, 
is commonplace.213 Fourth, the Church, the family, and the Mafia are often more 
influential than state institutions.214 
Italy’s proud yet tumultuous history also manifests itself within the national 
character. Cavalli describes national character as the “cumulative impact of a series of 
formative historical experiences.”215 The post-medieval Italian peninsula took 
significantly longer to consolidate politically than many of its European counterparts, and 
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its eventual unification was only possible under strong coercion of force.216 Local and 
regional loyalties that had existed for over a thousand years in many places would not be 
soon forgotten; some persist to this day. Historical elements influencing the national 
character also include, according to Cavalli, “the persistence of…corrupt governments; 
the lack of a Protestant reformation and the cumbersome presence of the Vatican; the 
absence of a hegemonic national class and culture; the weakness of the middle class; the 
absence of a true democratic revolution;…a political system that…never permitted a 
routine alternation of power between contending political parties.”217 
As a consequence of these historical experiences, cultural traits such as 
individualism, familism, particularism, clientelism, fatalism, and institutional skepticism 
are especially strong.218 From this list, familism and institutional skepticism are 
especially noteworthy. “Amoral familism”—as described by Edward Banfield following 
a study of a rural town in Basilicata—motivates Italians to act to “maximize the material, 
short-run advantage of the nuclear family; [and to] assume all others will do the 
same.”219 Cavalli also describes a “conspicuous gap between interpersonal trust…and 
trust in institutions” that is uniquely Italian.220 Italy used to be relatively low in both 
categories; polls indicate that interpersonal trust increased over the latter half of the 20th 
century and is now nearly on par with other Western nations while institutional trust 
remains remarkably low to this day.221 D’Entrèves argued that, “to a large number of 
Italians, the State is primarily a matter of force rather than of consent, of coercion rather 
than of conviction.”222 Considering the war-like unification and colossal “lies” that Italy 
has experienced over the course of its history, most notably during the fascist era, a 
pessimistic view of institutions would be a logical consequence. 
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2. The Italian National Character Manifested in Politics 
A Eurosceptic attitude is not simply the result of recent events; enduring elements 
of the Italian national character can often be identified as contributors to the troubled 
Italian political system and Eurosceptic sentiments. Institutional skepticism clearly goes 
hand-in-hand with a critical view of NATO and the EU. Cavalli furthermore observes 
how a predominant cultural presence of amoral familism generates a highly detrimental 
effect on Italian democracy: 
[Amoral familism] does not favor cooperation and solidarity, or 
participation and association in order to pursue common goals; that is, 
missing is that social fabric to which the values, practices, and institutions 
of democracy adhere and by which they are fed. From this perspective, 
democracy cannot develop without an appropriate “civic spirit”...on the 
part of the citizens, of which familism is the exact negation.223 
Serricchio asserts that, “The more one knows about Europe, the more ready one is to 
support it.”224 Amoral familism and the lack of civic spirit results in less political 
knowledge in the Italian case, and low levels of Europeanism are thus a predictable 
outcome. 
In a broader sense, Italians tend to emphasize private truth while accepting public 
dishonesty. Giorgio Bocca summarized the Italian mindset: “They think the only 
expedient way to live in public is to lie or to keep silent. They compensate for this by 
preserving their own private truths…The humble lie by necessity, the powerful by 
cunning and arrogance.”225 Barzini adds, “The Italians’ public role is not always 
entirely play-acting. Most of them are unaware of their double life. They think it 
natural. They are sincere, or hope that what they pretend to believe in public may be 
true.”226 These traits have been manifested accordingly in the political realm. Great 
hope that resulted in unfulfilled promises has been a common political theme over 
the years—beginning with the House of Savoy and enduring through Mussolini’s 
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Fascism, Enrico Berlinguer and the historic compromise, the rise and fall of the PSI, 
and eventually Berlusconi.  
Italy is furthermore a land steeped in tradition; the relatively small peninsula is 
home to more UNESCO World Heritage Sites than any other country on Earth.227 
Although Italians take pride in many of their traditions, longstanding political instability 
and inefficiency are not sources of satisfaction. A casual observer might think that the 
combination of familism, institutional skepticism, and established tradition would 
promote indifference or even acceptance in regard to political shortcomings. On the 
contrary, Italians detest the political system which has disappointed time and time again. 
According to Luigi Barzini, “It is not true…that Italians enjoy and are at their best living 
precariously in a disorderly country ruled by inept and impotent, or arbitrary and corrupt 
governments. They never liked it.”228 Barzini describes the Italian dream that has 
persisted over the centuries as follows: 
For centuries, since the early Middle Ages, they [Italians] have dreamed 
the same impossible  dream of being one day governed with  freedom  and  
justice,  of  being  able to dedicate  their energies solely  to their  work  
and not  to the task  of  avoiding  cramping and frustrating laws or 
defending themselves  from dangerous and powerful enemies. They 
dreamed of living an honorable, transparent life in peace in an honorable, 
transparent country in which there should be no need to lie.229 
Such a persisting dream and the history of unfulfilled promises push Italians to eschew 
traditional politics and pursue alternative solutions. Italians are thus more open to radical 
agendas or anti-system platforms than they might be otherwise.  
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D. THE EURO ZONE CRISIS AND A STAGNANT ECONOMY 
1. The Tendency of Financial Crises to Promote Radical Agendas 
Financial crises have a well-established history of promoting radical politics. A 
comprehensive study by Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick, and Christoph Trebesch of 
the political fallout from financial crises in Europe over the past 140 years concludes that 
“policy uncertainty rises strongly after financial crises as government majorities shrink 
and polarization rises.”230 Funke and his co-authors add that “voters seem to be 
particularly attracted to the political rhetoric of the extreme right, which often attributes 
blame to minorities or foreigners. On average, far-right parties increase their vote share 
by 30% after a financial crisis.”231 
Italy’s experience with Mussolini is noteworthy in this respect. The popularity of 
Mussolini’s far right fascist alliance surged in the years following World War I thanks in 
part to a global recession and an Italian banking crisis. Fascists did not gain 
parliamentary representation until 1921, and even then they controlled only a small 
handful of seats. The 1919–1920 Biennio Rosso, or Two Red Years, of social conflict 
stemmed from the economic crisis and led to the March on Rome of 1922 that brought 
Mussolini to power. In 1924 the National Fascist Party was officially voted in with 65 
percent of the overall vote, proving the powerful influence that economics can have on 
radical political sentiment.232 
The Northern League and the Five Star Movement have also arguably managed to 
increase their influence by leveraging economic distress.233 Funke and his co-authors 
write that “the 1990 Italian financial crisis was followed by the sudden rise of 
the…Northern League party. This party increased its vote share from just 1.3% in the 
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1987 elections to 8.7% in the post-crisis elections of 1992.”234 The rapid rise of Grillo’s 
M5S was also partly facilitated by the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis due to the 
movement’s radical platform.235 The tendency for financial crises to promote radical 
politics further suggests that the LN and the M5S could benefit from persisting economic 
struggles or future crises.  
2. The 2008 Financial Crisis and Continued Economic Stagnation 
The global financial crisis that began in 2008 coincided with a drastic increase in 
euroscepticism across Europe.236 The percentage of citizens who opposed EU 
membership for their country, as measured by annual Eurobarometer surveys, rose by 12 
percentage points or more between 2007 and 2011 in Greece, Portugal, and Slovenia.237 
In four others—Lithuania, Spain, Cyprus, and Ireland—it rose by at least 7%.238 Italy, by 
comparison, was among the 15 member states that experienced a relatively moderate rise 
in euroscepticism of 6 percentage points or less.239 
Statistical analysis by Fabio Serricchio, Myrto Tsakatika, and Lucia Quaglia 
indicates that citizens’ perceptions of the national economy had only minimal direct 
impact upon eurosceptical views in most EU countries.240 The crisis also caused 
institutional trust, both national and European, to shift significantly; this indirect effect of 
the crisis correlates very strongly with increases in euroscepticism.241 Citizens first 
looked for national solutions during the banking crises of 2008 and the EU later 
implemented new institutions during the sovereign debt crisis, including the European 
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Security Mechanism (ESM) in 2011.242 Institutional trust in Italy was already historically 
low, so the crisis did not introduce a new source of euroscepticism but rather exacerbated 
an existing one. The study by Serricchio and his co-authors concludes that the crisis only 
magnified issues of trust which had been gradually growing since the inception of the 
EU: 
The crisis has not brought economics back in as the most important source 
of Euroscepticism during the turbulent period of 2007–10. Rather, it has 
not only confirmed, but indeed exacerbated, the post-1992 trends, 
according to which national identity and political institutions play an 
increasingly important role in explaining public Euroscepticism.243  
Seven years after the onset of the crisis, Italy is still viewed as one of the weakest 
links in the euro zone due to a stagnant economy and an extreme level of indebtedness.244 
James Politi of the Financial Times asserts that “profound pessimism about the economy 
has become deeply ingrained in the Italian psyche, after more than a decade of economic 
stagnation and six years of economic and financial crises.”245 Jacopo Barbati elaborates 
on how many Italian citizens blame the EU for the nation’s struggles even though the real 
causative factors are much more complex: 
For most Italians, the equation was simple: “In 2001, I was living in a 
country which had the seventh biggest GDP in the world. Now I live in the 
same country but we have nearly 40% of young people who are 
unemployed, with enterprises closing every day, and businessmen 
committing suicide over their debts. What changed since 2001? A-ha! The 
euro! We got the Euro!” Nobody is explaining to people, who are indeed 
really suffering, that the situation is a bit more complex.246 
Many analysts believed the Italian economy could rebound in 2014, but EU 
sanctions on Russia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis dealt a major blow to Italian exports 
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and Italy’s GDP declined for the third year in a row.247 The Bank of Italy, the European 
Commission, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) all assert that the Italian 
economy is picking up—albeit more slowly than other economies across the euro 
zone.248 Italy’s GDP grew slightly in 2015, and both the European Commission and the 
IMF forecast that Italy’s GDP will grow even more in 2016.249 The Italian economy will 
nonetheless continue to face grave challenges in 2016 and beyond.250 Growth remains 
significantly lower and unemployment is still much higher than in other major EU 
countries while instability plagues Italian financial institutions.251 Even if the worst of 
the economic recession has passed, public opinion will remain skeptical about prospects 
for a durable recovery. Italian Minister of Finance Pier Carlo Padoan remarked in May 
2015 that “People have gone through three years of recession that…in economic terms is 
equivalent to war, and it takes time before you think the good old times can come back 
again.”252 Reversing perceived causes of economic setbacks such as sanctions against 
Russia will thus retain popular support for the foreseeable future. 
E. RUSSIAN RELATIONS 
Italy has become increasingly interconnected with Russia since the end of the 
Cold War, and the relationship with Moscow continues to moderate pro-West 
enthusiasm. With certain policies comparable to those of the Soviet Union (USSR), 
Russia remains in many respects the nemesis of NATO and the EU. Russia seeks to 
achieve its national interests by undermining NATO and EU cohesion at every 
opportunity; stronger alignment with Russia generally equates to weakened commitment 
to the Euro-Atlantic institutions, and vice versa. The Russia relationship can thus have a 
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compounding effect: as euroscepticism encourages stronger bilateral relations with 
Russia, stronger relations with Russia can in turn further undermine Euro-Atlantic 
commitment.  
1. The Italy–Russia Bilateral Relationship 
Riccardo Alcaro asserts, “Italy and Russia diverge on virtually everything from 
geographical location to climate, from size to strategic landscape, from history to cultural 
heritage and political, economic, and social development. Yet, relations between the two 
countries have been remarkably strong historically.”253 Italy and the USSR managed to 
strengthen a relationship that had been built over the centuries even within the hostile 
environment of the Cold War.254 The Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) was not only the 
West’s largest Communist party but also the most influential; Alcaro adds, “Combined 
with Italy’s geographical location on the edge of the East-West line of demarcation, the 
PCI’s electoral strength made the country one of the Cold War’s most prominent 
theatres.”255 In 1969 Italy became one of the first Western countries to implement an 
energy relationship with the USSR, and Fiat was permitted to commence production of 
motor vehicles in the USSR one year later.256 In recent years, according to the Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “bilateral relations [between Italy and Russia] have achieved 
a high level of excellence deserving of ‘privileged relations’ status.”257 Italy is the 
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Russian Federation’s third-largest trade partner and seventh-largest supplier.258 Frequent 
meetings and events provide further evidence of the strong bilateral relationship.259 
Italy also emphasizes strong cultural ties to Russia and distinguishes itself from 
other EU or NATO powers in this area.260 During his tenure as Prime Minister and 
subsequently, Silvio Berlusconi was especially proud of his close friendship with 
Vladimir Putin. Berlusconi has made it clear that he will support Putin over EU policy; in 
October 2015 Berlusconi defied the EU by voicing support for Moscow’s actions in both 
Syria and Ukraine.261 Alcaro asserts that “Berlusconi indulged massively in celebrating 
the benefits of his comradeship with Putin, as if Italy’s strong relationship with Russia 
was a by-product of it. The truth, however, was that Berlusconi found a willing partner in 
Putin (and vice versa) because Italy and Russia are tied by more enduring factors than the 
goodwill of individuals.”262 In 2004 Berlusconi and Putin formed the Russian-Italian 
Civil Society Dialogue Forum, which has since produced a number of joint initiatives.263 
The partners designated 2011 the cross-year of language and culture in Italy and Russia; 
2013 was likewise declared the Russia-Italy cross-year of tourism. Russian schools at all 
levels have furthermore committed to teaching the Italian language.264 The vision of both 
countries’ leaders, according to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, is “to maintain 
and improve the atmosphere of trust, mutual understanding and enhancing cultural ties 
and contacts between our people.”265  
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Lavrov has further developed the commitment to the Russo-Italian partnership, 
albeit in a slightly different light. Lavrov notes that Italy and Russia “have achieved 
major results through economic cooperation…Italian companies have invested heavily in 
the Russian economy; [Italy and Russia]…are implementing numerous projects of mutual 
benefit.”266 Lavrov, however, blames the EU for disrupting the Russo-Italian relationship 
and calls for Russia and Italy to cultivate a closer partnership: 
Unfortunately, the evolution of Russian-Italian cooperation has slowed 
considerably due to the decline of Russian-EU relations over the 
Ukrainian crisis. A number of important events, including at the top level, 
have not been held. Bilateral trade fell by 10 per cent compared to 2013 
and amounts to $48.4 billion. There is a downward trend in tourism. I am 
confident that none of this meets the fundamental interests of our 
countries…[High-level meetings between Russia and Italy have] 
reaffirmed mutual interest in preserving the achievements of the bilateral 
cooperation of the past years….We…appreciate Italy’s desire to help 
improve the situation in Europe, normalise Russia-EU relations, and 
Rome’s commitment to a peaceful political solution to the internal 
Ukrainian crisis.267 
Lavrov and other Russians are openly trying to weaken Italy’s ties with the EU; how the 
Italians will respond remains to be seen.  
2. The Italy–Russia Relationship in the Euro-Atlantic Context 
Such an important partnership with Russia can serve as a deterrent for Italy to 
sustain full support of the EU and NATO, especially since further NATO or EU 
expansion could, the Russians hold, widen the East-West divide and further disrupt a 
vital economic relationship. The Putin administration has strengthened Russia’s die-
hard opposition to the Euro-Atlantic institutions; the Ukraine crisis has further 
cemented this opposition.268 Many Westerners believed before the crisis that Russia 
was somewhat open-minded concerning Ukraine’s growing relationship with the EU 
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and NATO, but the crisis has proven the opposite.269 The EU and NATO aim for 
Europe-wide cohesion. As Michael Rühle writes, the “continental unification 
project…does not have an ‘end point’ that could be convincingly defined…or 
morally justified…Precisely because the two organizations’ respective enlargement 
processes are not intended as anti-Russian projects, they are open-ended and can 
hardly be perceived by Russia as anything but a permanent assault on its global and 
regional power and influence.”270 
Russia is not passive in its opposition but is rather taking calculated measures to 
undermine Euro-Atlantic cohesion.271 Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu conclude, “EU 
leaders believe that peace and stability are built through interdependence; Russia’s 
leaders are working to create a situation where the EU needs Russia more than Russia 
needs the EU, particularly in the energy sector.”272 Within the energy sector, Leonard 
and Popescu assert that Russia is “picking off individual EU member states and signing 
long-term deals which undermine the core principles of the EU’s common strategy.”273 
The Italian energy supplier ENI is one of the paramount international partners of 
Gazprom, Russia’s massive state-controlled energy provider. The agreement between the 
two energy giants extends to 2035, meaning that Italy will remain dependent on Russia 
for the long haul.274  
Russia has thus reemerged as one of the most divisive issues among the members 
of the EU.275 Italy is not Russia’s only privileged partner; Germany is Russia’s largest 
trade partner among EU nations, France argues that it has historically shared a similar 
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view of international relations, and close UK-U.S. relations set the UK apart for an 
unparalleled ability to liaise between the United States and Russia.276 Leonard and 
Popescu note that “in the 1990s, EU members found it easy to agree on a common 
approach to Moscow. They coalesced around a strategy of democratising and 
westernising a weak and indebted Russia. That strategy is now in tatters.”277 The EU may 
have failed to change Russia during the Putin era, but Russia has undoubtedly generated a 
massive impact on the EU.278  
In 2010 Pål Jonson grouped each NATO nation into one of three categories 
regarding its approach to NATO’s core tasks: “collective defenders,” “expeditionaries,” 
and “Russia firsters.”279 Italy—along with Belgium, France, Germany, Portugal, and 
Spain—fell into Jonson’s “Russia firster” category, which prioritizes positive relations 
with Moscow and are thus more concerned that the rest of the Allies with Russian 
perceptions of NATO actions.280 The study concluded that Italy and Germany have stood 
out as the most Russia-sensitive; others in the category have exhibited such a mentality to 
a lesser degree or have simply provided support to the German and Italian positions.281 
Leonard and Popescu’s 2007 study of policy approaches toward Russia classified 
each EU member into one of five distinct categories, which are shown in Table 1. The 
authors do not consider Italy to be in the same tier as Greece or Cyprus in terms of 
willingness to oppose EU policy and defend Russian interests, but Italy does fall in the 
second tier along with France, Germany, and Spain: strategic partners of Russia who do 
occasionally undermine EU policy.282 
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Table 1.   Summary of EU Nations’ Policy Approach toward Russia 
Category Description Countries 
Trojan Horses 
Often defend Russia in the EU system 





Enjoy a special relationship with Russia 






Maintain a close relationship with Russia 









Focus on business interests but are less 
afraid than others to speak out against 
Russian behavior 
Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, 




Have an overtly hostile relationship 
Are willing to use the veto to block EU 
negotiations with Russia 
Lithuania, Poland 
Adapted from Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, “A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations,” (policy paper, 
European Council on Foreign Relations, 2007), 2, http://ecfr.3cdn.net/1ef82b3f011e075853_ 
0fm6bphgw.pdf. 
Alcaro points out, “When developments within the EU or NATO have encroached 
on what is perceived as a national priority, Italian elites have generally worked toward 
orientating EU and NATO action according to their special sensitivities.”283 In the case 
of relations with Russia, however, Italy has at times resisted or ignored developments in 
major policy areas such as European security, energy security, and human rights and 
democracy.284 Alcaro concludes that Italy, “in several instances, has seemed to accord 
preference to its relations with Russia over its commitment to being a diligent 
implementer of policies set at the EU or NATO level. This interpretation is shared both in 
European capitals and Moscow, as well as in Washington.”285 
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In sum, nationalist agendas in Italian politics generally favor closer alignment 
with Russia. Foreign Minister Lavrov’s statement highlighted how a divide between Italy 
and Russia is not in the national interest of either country. Because full restoration of 
positive relations with Russia and full support of Euro-Atlantic policy are not 
simultaneously possible in the current environment, Italy employs a tradeoff between the 
two. The Russian relationship at times causes Italy to contradict or disregard EU or 
NATO policy, but the extent and frequency of such opposition hinges upon the priorities 
of the Italian leadership. The more value that Italy places upon the Russian relationship, 
the more distant the country may become from its Euro-Atlantic counterparts. As 
nationalists or eurosceptics push Italy toward greater cooperation with Russia, therefore, 
Russia will push Italy further toward nationalism and Euroscepticism. 
F. EXPANSION OF NATO AND THE EU 
For Western Europeans who belonged to the European Communities, the Cold 
War demonstrated the advantages of a divided Europe: the inner six (Belgium, France, 
West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) included five of the richest or 
potentially richest countries in Europe, U.S. defense expenditures guaranteed the security 
of Western Europe, and the USSR ensured that the less-wealthy eastern bloc would not 
join European integration.286 Even after the end of the Cold War, therefore, it is 
unsurprising that in some quarters Western European skepticism about extending 
“Europe” eastward has endured.  
NATO gradually expanded as it extended membership to an increasing number of 
post-communist states. NATO expansion has never been overtly opposed by Italy, yet 
Italy has been, at times, in favor of slowing down the eastward push.287 As the EU 
matured, it also intended to incorporate a greater number of Eastern European countries; 
Italy thought it best that nations be simultaneously integrated into the EU and NATO.288 
In this way, security commonalities could be emphasized and complexities would not be 
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caused by membership gaps between the two organizations.289 Also, Italy feared that 
NATO enlargement might shift the Alliance’s focus to the northeast—and away from the 
volatile southern region.290 To counteract this fear, Italy campaigned for the Alliance to 
incorporate its eastern neighbor, Slovenia, and later sought to establish a “Mediterranean 
Dialogue” involving NATO and selected partner countries.291 
Both left and right governments in Italy have generally supported the possible 
accession to NATO and the EU of additional Balkan countries and Turkey—with some 
anticipated dissent from the Northern League stemming from the Islamic culture of 
Turkey.292 According to some accounts, however, the expansion of NATO and the EU is 
especially controversial in Italy relative to other member states. Pew Research, when 
estimating support within member nations in 2009 for six potential EU accessions 
(Croatia, Georgia, Iceland, Serbia, Turkey, and Ukraine), concluded that the Italian 
population showed the lowest level of support in each case.293 The same 2009 poll also 
indicated that Italians showed the least support of any NATO country for Ukrainian 
membership.294 Ironically, the public in only two Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries 
showed greater opposition than did the Italian public to Ukraine’s bid for NATO 
membership: Russia and Ukraine itself.295 Another poll in 2008 indicated that more 
Italians would oppose defense of the Baltic states under Article 5 than would support it—
even though all three Baltic states had become NATO members in 2004.296 
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Italian opposition to EU enlargement is both economic and cultural. Serricchio 
asserts that EU enlargement fosters euroscepticism in Italy because expansion “has 
brought a change in the distribution of Community financial assistance and its probable 
reduction as well as a perceived threat to cultural identities.”297 On one hand, 
enlargement has reduced EU expenditures in Italy while Italy’s national contribution has 
remained relatively constant—a net loss from a purely contribution-returns perspective. 
The possibility of further EU enlargement to the east threatens to further diminish Italy’s 
share of EU subsidies. On the other hand, EU expansion exacerbates the threat to the 
established European and Italian identity. Many Italians already view the European 
identity as a threat to the national or sub-national one.298 The big issue with expansion, 
according to Serricchio, is that “Italians consider the citizens of these countries [to the 
east] as non-European, that is, as being part of the outgroup, therefore as foreigners.”299  
It is perhaps unsurprising that the gradual decline in support among Italian 
citizens for European institutions and the drop in European identity over the last two 
decades have coincided with gradual expansion of the EU and NATO. Serricchio’s 
statistical analysis suggests that “Europe is perceived above all as a source of economic 
benefits” and thus EU expansion has “played a decisive role in the progressive 
detachment of Italian citizens from that supranational entity to which they had always 
looked with great enthusiasm.”300 One must ask, concludes Serricchio, “If Europe begins 
to threaten the cultural heritage and traditions Italians are very proud of, while also 
promising less in the way of economic assistance, why continue to support it?”301 
Although Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, 
announced in 2014 that the EU has no plans to expand in the next five years, the 
established guidance of the EU still stipulates that any European nation which meets the 
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required conditions may become eligible for membership.302 The EU has also officially 
designated five nations as candidates—Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and 
Turkey—and two more as potential candidates—Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo—
as of 2015.303 All seven of these potential accessions fall into the exact category—
”easterners” who would further reduce EU expenditures in Italy and threaten established 
identities—to which Italians are most opposed.  
G. ONGOING IMMIGRATION CRISIS 
As refugees from Africa and the Middle East flood Europe, migrant flows are met 
with increasing opposition. Immigration and the associated anti-immigration sentiments 
are making headlines across Europe, but Italy is among the nations hardest hit by the 
crisis. Italy is overwhelmed not only in handling the massive number of immigrants who 
safely reach Italy’s shores but also in providing life-saving assistance to those crossing 
the Central Mediterranean. Prime Minister Renzi has unveiled a plan to distribute 
immigrants throughout Italy, but many Italians are fighting with all their might to reduce, 
confine, or prevent immigration. The xenophobic Northern League is leading the charge, 
arguing that migrant boats should be turned away from Italian shores. 
1. Overview of the Immigration Crisis 
The Central Mediterranean has become the most dangerous migration route in the 
world. Armed sentries and razor-wire fences are essentially non-existent on Italy’s 
southern shores, yet more than twice as many people die trying to reach Italy than the rest 
of the world combined. Figures 15 and 16 from the Missing Migrants project illustrate 
this point: 5,113 migrants worldwide died crossing borders in 2015; 3,771 occurred 
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crossing the Mediterranean. Of the 5,113 total deaths, 2,892, or 57%, were attempting to 
reach Italy. 
Figure 15.  Global Overview of Migrant Deaths in 2015  
 
Data as of December 18, 2015. Source: “Mediterranean Update,” Missing Migrants Project, last 
modified December 18, 2015, http://missingmigrants.iom.int/en/infographics. 
Figure 16.  Immigration Arrivals and Deaths across the Mediterranean in 2015 
 
Adapted from “Mediterranean Update,” Missing Migrants Project, last modified December 
31, 2015, http://missingmigrants.iom.int/en/infographics. 
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The previous figures also note that 1,003,124 migrants safely arrived in 2015. It is 
debatable, however, which number is causing the most public outcry: the 3,771 deaths or 
the 1,003,124 arrivals. Both numbers are increasing daily, leading to mounting 
dissatisfaction within the Italian populace. Moreover, a growing number of Europeans 
believe that immigration poses a significant security threat and thus feel more threatened 
by immigration than they have in years past.304 
Italy has the third-highest coastline-to-area ratio in continental Europe, yet nearly 
all migrants enter via two tiny islands. The islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa sit only 
37 and 70 miles off the coast of Tunisia, respectively. Both islands are roughly twice as 
close to Tunisia as they are to Sicily.305 From these remote islands, immigrants are 
ferried to Sicily for follow-on transfer to welcome centers (centri di accoglienza), shown 
in Figure 17, dispersed throughout mainland Italy to await a temporary visa.306 
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Figure 17.  Immigrant Welcome Centers throughout Italy 
 
Source: “CIE, CDA, and CARA,” last modified September 30, 2011, 
https://strugglesinitaly.wordpress.com/equality/en-immigrants-detention-centers-in-
italy/#cdacaracie. 
The Schengen Area, which Italy joined in 1997, allows the free flow of people 
and goods through open borders between 26 member nations. Once migrants reach Italy, 
therefore, they have relatively barrier-free access to the other 25 nations within the 
Schengen Area. In this way Italy becomes a jumping off point for immigrants—both 
legal and illegal—to the rest of the EU. Most immigrants do not ultimately settle in Italy 
but instead journey on to other prosperous nations within Europe; in 2014 Germany and 
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Sweden received significantly more asylum applications than did Italy.307 Cross-
Mediterranean immigration is clearly more than an Italian problem, yet convincing the 
entirety of the EU that it is an EU problem has proven highly challenging. 
2. National Response to the Immigration Crisis 
Italy has been battling illegal immigration for decades; only recently has 
immigration from the coasts of Northern Africa garnered so much attention. Immigration 
was a relatively minor issue during the Cold War years as most Communist regimes 
discouraged labor migration. Crises in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and 
Kosovo during the 1990s, however, caused floods of refugees to migrate across the 
Adriatic or the land borders of northeastern Italy. The Northern League was 
simultaneously gaining momentum during the 1990s across northern Italy with its pro-
North rhetoric, yet its xenophobic anti-immigration stance was just as strong. As it gained 
parliamentary representation, the Northern League ardently fought to clamp down on 
illegal immigration while receiving heavy criticism that the party’s proposed measures 
undermined human rights.308  
A 2013 shipwreck off the coast of Lampedusa, which resulted in the death of at 
least 360 immigrants, was the first in the series of incidents that has brought immigration 
across the Mediterranean squarely into the spotlight.309 Italy commenced a dedicated 
national operation, Operation Mare Nostrum (OMN), in October 2013 in response to the 
perceived humanitarian emergency.310 An average total of five naval and air units, which 
included frigates, amphibious vessels, patrollers, corvettes, helicopters, and maritime 
patrol aircraft, were deployed at any given time to support the operation. Roughly 900 
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military personnel participated every day.311 The Italian Ministry of Defense estimates 
that the operations rescued 150,810 migrants, seized 5 mother ships, and brought 330 
smugglers to justice during the year-long operation.312 The impressive efforts were not 
politically or financially sustainable in the long term, however, and in November 2014 
the operation transitioned to an Italian-led EU operation, Operation Triton. 
In 2013 the Northern League was in full decline as the party’s xenophobic 
agenda, carried over from Balkans crises of the 1990s and 2000s, was becoming obsolete 
in the minds of many. The 2013 shipwreck that initiated the public outcry, however, 
reinvigorated the League’s xenophobic agenda.313 Salvini has repeatedly argued that the 
boatloads of migrants must forcibly be kept off Italian shores rather than allowed to 
disembark.314 After Pope Francis called for forgiveness of “those who close the door on 
these people who are looking for life,” Salvini retorted, “We don’t need anyone’s 
forgiveness.”315 The highly-popular governor of Veneto, Luca Zaia, proclaimed that the 
overwhelming migrant presence would have a “devastating effect” on local tourism and 
thus ordered that immigrants be evicted from reception centers or other housing near 
tourist destinations.316 Zaia denies ever eating non-Italian foods such as a kebab or a 
pineapple and supported a crackdown on restaurants that serve non-Italian food.317 
Examples of inflammatory league propaganda posters shown in Figure 18 imply that 
Native Americans live on reservations because they tolerated immigration or that torture 
is a legitimate defense against illegal immigration. The extreme statements by the League 
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are clearly more than a show; they are a full declaration of antagonism against Rome, 
Brussels, and anyone crossing the Mediterranean to Italy. 
Figure 18.  Examples of Inflammatory League Propoganda 
Sources: “Loro Hanno Subito l’Immigrazione; Ora Vivono nelle Riserve!” [They 
Submitted to Immigration; Now They Live on Reservations!] Northern League Section of 
Collegno and Grugliasco, last modified November 13, 2012, 
http://leganordcollegno.blogspot.com/2012/11/loro-hanno-subito-limmigrazione-ora.html; 
“Immigrati Clandestini: Torturali! E Legittima Difesa,” [Illegal Immigrants: Torture 
Them! It Is a Legitimate Defense] PeaceLink, August 28, 2009, 
http://www.peacelink.it/migranti/a/30095.html. 
The League’s strong nationalist platform has not entirely abandoned its regionalist 
flair. The League’s core belief since its inception has been that the northerners should not 
be burdened by the South’s problems. Many League members argue that Mediterranean 
immigration is another one of the South’s problems that should not burden northerners – 
most immigrants, after all, enter via Italy’s southern islands. Northerners who adopt this 
view strive to confine the problem to the South as much as possible. Renzi’s distribution 
plan is the exact negation of such an agenda and thus adds fuel to the already-raging fire. 
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IV. ITALY’S ROLE IN EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY AND 
DEFENSE 
A. ITALY’S ROLE IN NATO 
Italy’s precarious position between East and West in the Cold War context 
moderated Italy’s willingness to take action that could be perceived as hostile by the 
Eastern bloc.318 The Cold War, however, also strengthened Italy’s commitment to 
NATO. Croci asserts that “NATO might have been the ideal means to counter the Soviet 
threat…Italy, largely because of its geo-strategic position, could limit itself to paying 
only lip-service to the Atlantic alliance, which was a reliable dispenser of security 
through the American nuclear umbrella. National security interests were both defined 
and guaranteed by membership in the alliance.”319 
As Cold War tensions thawed, Italy increased its presence in the realms of 
foreign and security policy during the early 1990s.320 The post-Cold War 
environment has required Italy to adjust its posture within collective security 
institutions for three reasons.321 First, the nature of the post-Cold War challenges is 
more diverse; NATO was an ideal hedge against the Soviets but was less equipped 
for other emerging problems.322 Croci notes that these challenges are often typified 
by “local crises in neighbouring regions that may develop into conflicts and that can 
cause large and uncontrollable migratory inflows of people; because of its 
geographical location, Italy is in the front line when it comes to dealing with such 
emergencies.”323 Second, dissention and disagreements—especially between 
Americans and Europeans—are more probable in the multipolar post-Cold War 
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environment than they were during the bipolar Cold War years.324 Thirdly, if a 
strong policy disagreement between the United States and its European Allies were 
to preclude consensus within NATO, individual European nations lack the 
capability—structurally, politically, and militarily—to act alone in large-scale 
contingencies.325 Croci sums up Italian security policy in the post-Cold War 
environment as follows:  
Italian security is no longer guaranteed by simple membership in the 
alliance; Italy has revised its traditional role as a ‘security-consuming’ 
country and embarked on an effort to become also a ‘security-
producing’ country. Thus, since the early 1990s, Italian governments 
have pursued a number of policies aimed at reinforcing and 
functionally linking…the United Nations (UN), NATO, and the…EU. 
Italy’s aim is to shape these organizations in such a way as to enable 
them, individually or collectively, to meet the new type of threat to 
which Italy is particularly exposed given its proximity to two turbulent 
regions: the Balkans and the southern shore of the Mediterranean.326 
Italy has fully supported the new NATO missions involving crisis management 
and out-of-area crisis deployments.327 Despite strong reservations against Operation 
Allied Force (OAF) in the Kosovo conflict, Italy joined with France, Germany, the UK, 
and the United States to assume clear leadership of the operation within NATO.328 Italy 
preferred a different course of action, so the Kosovo intervention exemplifies how Italy’s 
long-term commitment to the alliance as its security guarantor may trump short-term 
national sentiments.329 The “Quint”—foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the 
UK, and the United States—guided political strategy during OAF.330 Each country took 
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command of one of the five multinational brigades (MNB) and provided at least half of 
the troops within that brigade; Italy commanded MNB West.331 Italy also deployed 
members of the Carabinieri, a specialized domestic military police, to support the NATO-
led Kosovo Force multinational specialized unit.332  
In Afghanistan, Italy demonstrated strong solidarity with the U.S. in joining 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) before NATO officially joined the fight in 2003.333 
James Sperling and Mark Webber note, “As it turned out, certain NATO allies, 
particularly Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the UK, made significant contributions 
to ground combat operations and devoted an impressive share of national naval and air 
assets.”334 Italy made separate contributions to NATO’s International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF). 
Analysis of the total contributions to Kosovo, OEF, and ISAF reveals that Italy 
pulled its weight by contributing a proportional share of military assets to these 
operations while many other long-term NATO allies failed to do so.335 Italy also played a 
large role in NATO Training Mission—Iraq. Over 50 percent of the deployed personnel 
were Italian, as the Carabinieri were again called upon to provide specialized 
assistance.336 
Italy again reaffirmed its strong support for the alliance during Operation Unified 
Protector in 2011. Libya was arguably the most important of Italy’s colonial ties to 
Africa, and Italy had maintained strong diplomatic relations with the Gadhafi regime. The 
Italian economy was furthermore highly dependent on Libyan energy resources. It was 
challenging for Italy to go to war against such a vital economic partner and thus it 
staunchly objected to the initial non-NATO command structure; nonetheless it stood firm 
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in its commitment to the alliance.337 Jeffrey H. Michaels further describes how Italy went 
as far as to make “a veiled threat to withdraw the use of its bases unless the Alliance was 
put in charge.”338 Such action would have been a crippling blow to the coalition effort 
because a large number of air assets were based in Italy during the operation.339 Under 
the umbrella of NATO, however, Italy again proved to be strong partner and an 
indispensable asset. With the Italian Air Force undertaking its biggest mission since 
World War II, Luca Peruzzi states that “Italian aircraft dropped over 700 PGMs 
[precision guided munitions] and took several new systems into action for the first time. 
Italy was something of an unsung hero during 2011’s operations ‘Odyssey Dawn’ (OOD) 
and ‘Unified Protector.’”340 
B. ITALY’S ROLE IN EU SECURITY COOPERATION 
Henry Kissinger is reported to have sarcastically remarked during his tenure as 
the U.S. Secretary of State that “when it comes to foreign and defense policy, Europe 
does not even have a telephone number.”341 The Western European Union (WEU) 
provided a forum for consultation and cooperation apart from NATO from 1954 through 
2011, but it lacked both the robust membership and cooperative will of the EU. Italy fully 
supported the development of a common foreign and security policy and a European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP); Croci notes that “unlike France, which still 
maintains a vague Gaullist attitude, Italy regards the development of the ESDP clearly 
and uncompromisingly as complementary and not alternative to the strengthening of 
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NATO.”342 Massimo D’Alema, who served as the Italian Prime Minister from 1998–
2000, stated in 1999 that his government was “convinced that developing a European 
defence identity would strengthen inter-Atlantic relations, not least because it would 
move towards overcoming a division of labour among allies that is obsolete, thereby 
allowing for more effective management of current crises.”343 
The creation of the ESDP was finally announced in 1999 after the Balkan crises in 
Bosnia and Kosovo had underscored the need for a common EU security policy. The 
ESDP, which was renamed the Common Security and Defense Policy by the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2009, gradually assumed a larger role as the WEU transferred the majority of 
its security capabilities and functions to the ESDP.344 The Lisbon Treaty’s assumption of 
the WEU mutual defense clause effectively rendered the WEU obsolete; the next year the 
WEU announced that it had “accomplished its historical role” and member states agreed 
to close the organization.345 
Italy has been a leader in the operationalization of EU collective security.346 
When the state of Albania collapsed in 1997, the Italians spearheaded an effort to act 
within the EU framework and, after that plan failed, formed a coalition of the willing 
among EU member states.347 Operation Alba objectives were to restore order, deliver 
humanitarian aid, reconstruct the state through new elections, and, ultimately, to end the 
wave of refuges flowing out of Albania and across the Adriatic Sea.348 Alba was the first 
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Italian-led multinational operation and garnered support from 11 EU member states.349 
Italy’s initiative demonstrated that, in the words of D’Alema, it was “a country willing 
and able to take on direct responsibility” in such nearby crises.350 Some argue that 
Operation Alba represented a step backward from multilateral cooperation, although in 
the bigger picture it proved the necessity of cooperation at the EU level and a need for the 
EU to develop the capacity to collectively address such crises.351 
Alba also highlights how Italian national security issues such as immigration 
quickly become trans-European issues, especially for those countries within the Schengen 
Area. Recently, and especially since mid-2015, the ongoing Mediterranean immigration 
crisis has hammered home this point to even the most remote Schengen members. 
According to Michele Nones and Stefano Silvestri, “Cooperation at the EU level is 
essential for checking the risks emanating from both the Mediterranean basin/Middle 
East and the Balkans, notably illegal activities spanning drug and human trafficking, to 
which Italy is particularly permeable because of the deep-rooted presence of criminal 
organisations in its territory.”352 Croci adds that Italy historically represents “the closest 
and most porous...point of access to Europe for economic migrants, people claiming to be 
political refugees, and Islamic terrorists. Italy’s security policy…has concentrated on 
finding adequate ways and means of meeting this…challenge.”353 The contemporary 
flow of refugees from the Middle East through southeastern Europe has altered 
perceptions of the premier access points to Europe, yet Italian security policy remains 
highly focused on immigration. 
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The continuation of Operation Mare Nostrum through EU Operation Triton 
represents Italy’s most visible contribution to trans-European security within the EU 
framework. A statement released in 2014 by the European Commissioner for Home 
Affairs at the time, Cecilia Malmström, remarked: 
So many desperate people are trying to cross the Mediterranean, fleeing 
conflict and war. The EU and its Member States need to respond and take 
action to save lives. With the launch of the Triton operation, tailored to the 
needs and requests defined by the Italian authorities, the EU can show 
concrete solidarity to Italy, by reinforcing its border surveillance and 
supporting its humanitarian efforts.354  
The statement also recognized the significant accomplishments of OMN thus far and 
emphasized that EU efforts must supplement, not replace, Italian national efforts: 
With its Mare Nostrum operation, Italy has done a formidable job in 
assisting thousands upon thousands of refugees who have risked their lives 
by trying to cross the Mediterranean in rickety vessels. It is clear that the 
Triton operation cannot and will not replace Mare Nostrum…I am 
confident that Italy will continue to fulfil its European and international 
obligations and the European Commission stands ready to continue 
providing European assistance to such initiatives.355 
 
C. THE EFFECT OF EURO-ATLANTIC INSTITUTIONS ON ITALIAN 
NATIONAL INTERESTS 
Many regard NATO as the most successful alliance in history. In 1997 U.S. 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright went as far as to say that NATO “brought the 
former fascist nations, first Italy, then Germany, then Spain, back into the family of 
European democracies.”356 The EU represents to many the pinnacle of European 
integration which fueled rampant economic growth among member states in the latter 
half of the 20th century—a staggering turnaround from the political division and 
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economic stagnation which characterized the first half of the 20th century.357 Anything 
of value, however, comes at a price. Despite the unparalleled achievements of NATO and 
the EU, many Italians question to what extent these institutions still support or undermine 
Italian national interests—and that is the question explored here. 
1. How the EU and NATO Support Italian National Interests 
NATO and the EU are complementary in supporting Italian national interests. 
Both institutions offer powerful means to further the Italian worldview, economic 
benefits, and increased synergies with allies. NATO’s core functions of collective 
defense, crisis management, and cooperative security are fundamental to Italian national 
security.358 Participation in the Alliance’s nuclear sharing arrangements is another 
indispensable benefit for this non-nuclear-weapon state.  
a. NATO’s Core Tasks: An Indispensable Element 
NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept sets forth the three basic missions of NATO: 
collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.359 Collective defense 
was the foremost reason for the establishment of NATO in 1949 and remains the most 
important function that the alliance performs today. David Yost asserts that “the first 
priority of the Allies necessarily remains the security of their national territories,” which 
is the essence of collective defense.360 An armed invasion of Italy is much more difficult 
to imagine today than it was in 1949, yet NATO’s umbrella of collective defense has 
expanded to address the growing number of issues that have since emerged. Today this 
umbrella covers, according to Yost, “missile defense, cyber security, space operations, 
energy security, terrorism, and WMD proliferation”—all of which could pose great 
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danger to the Italian state.361 NATO’s collective defense, therefore, remains vitally 
important to Italian national interests. 
Since the early 1990s, NATO has increasingly emphasized its crisis management 
and cooperative security aspects.362 NATO’s three core tasks are highly interdependent, 
however, so the notion that one task could be performed without affecting the others is 
nearly unfathomable.363 Yost argues that “crisis management operations serve the 
security interests of the Allies, albeit without the immediacy of preparations for collective 
defense of Alliance territory in response to direct aggression.”364 NATO’s primary focus 
of operations during the 1990s was crisis management in the western Balkans, a region 
that concerns Italy more than most other NATO allies due to Italy’s close proximity and 
the waves of refugees that have stemmed from the crises.365 Leadership of Operation 
Alba exemplifies this point: Italy demonstrated the strongest national emphasis on 
security in the Balkans among EU members at the time, so Italy also stood to benefit 
from NATO intervention in other Balkan crises more than most other Allies. 
b. The Opportunity for a Middle Power to Have a Global Voice 
Sven Biscop describes Italy as a “middle power” which holds a unique worldview 
but also acknowledges that this worldview must be implemented collectively.366 Both 
NATO and the EU provide opportunities for Italy to promote its worldview beyond the 
local neighborhood. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), Italy’s 2014 military expenditure of $31 billion was the 12th-highest globally 
and equated to roughly half that of NATO’s top European spenders, Britain and 
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France.367 Italy’s defense spending has moreover dropped sharply over the last decade: 
2014 defense expenditures were 30% less than in 2004 and have fallen from NATO’s 
target level—2% of national GDP—to a mere 1.4%.368 Expenditures by all NATO 
members, however, totaled $881 billion—half of the global total and 28 times that of 
Italy alone. Italy has demonstrated a limited capability to act unilaterally within its own 
neighborhood but overall is best suited in a supporting role for collective operations. 
The EU has also emerged since the late 1990s as a global actor in security and 
defense matters. The EU did not vigorously pursue a global agenda during its early years, 
instead focusing on the integration of member and potential member states. The German 
press even coined a word—Selbstverzwergung, or “self-dwarfing”—to describe the EU’s 
insistence upon maintaining the focus inward. Shortcomings which limit the EU’s global 
influence—which include hard limits such as capability shortfalls and soft limits such as 
its lack of political consensus—are well-documented.369 The lack of unity has limited EU 
policy ambitions to date, as the more powerful EU members have often employed direct 
national action instead of collective engagement.370 Jolyon Howorth asserts, however, 
that “like it or not, the European Union…has become an international actor.”371 
The establishment of a European Commission President and High Representative-
Vice President for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty was a 
noteworthy step to finally give Europe a phone number on the international stage.372 The 
EU’s global role has further evolved in recent years through foreign policy initiatives and 
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overseas civilian and military missions.373 The EU’s 18 ongoing missions and 17 
completed missions, which spread across Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast 
Asia, are shown in Figures 19 and 20.374 
Figure 19.  Ongoing EU Military Civilian Operations/Missions 
 
Source: “Ongoing Missions and Operations,” European Union External Action Service, 
accessed December 5, 2015, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/. 
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Figure 20.  Completed EU Military and Civilian Operations and Missions 
 
Source: “Ongoing Missions and Operations,” European Union External Action Service, 
accessed December 5, 2015, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/. 
c. Economic Benefits and Increased Synergies with Allies 
The operational impacts of Italy’s financial woes were never more evident than on 
July 6, 2011, when Italy withdrew the aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi from NATO’s 
Operation Unified Protector in Libya. Claudia Major, Christian Mölling and Tomas 
Valasek note, “In doing so, [Italy] wrote military history: a NATO member-state sent 
home a key unit in the middle of war because the government had run out of money.”375 
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Given the economic difficulties of Italy, therefore, the economic benefits of NATO and 
the EU become all the more important. Perceived economic benefits have driven 
European integration in the form of the EU and its predecessors for over 60 years, 
although NATO also delivers cost savings through economies of scale within the military 
sector and provides security which increases stability and investor confidence.376 
Much of the debate regarding Italian support for the EU revolves around 
participation in the euro zone. Italy believed that its entry into the euro zone in 1998 
would promote long-term economic strength by curbing inflation and maintaining a 
strong currency. While some politicians argue that Italy would be better off if it had 
remained with or returned to the lira, economists generally argue the contrary. A study of 
inflation, trade, public debt, and GDP in the decade following entry into the euro zone by 
economists Paolo Manasse, Tommaso Nannicini, and Alessandro Saia indicates that the 
euro has largely been a positive factor for the Italian economy.377 According to the 
authors, “the primary objective behind Italy’s entry in the euro…was to control 
inflation.”378 Inflation has been curbed under the euro as promised—2.2% annually from 
1999 to 2009, down from 3.9% annually from 1992 to 1998—although simulations 
indicate that inflation might have dropped to similar levels even if Italy had remained 
with the lira.379 Inflation volatility, however, was conclusively lowered by adoption of 
the euro.380 Trade between Italy and its euro zone partners is also an estimated 38% 
higher than it would be if Italy had remained on the lira.381 Analysis indicates that this 
increase is a product of genuine trade creation rather than trade diversion from non-euro 
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members.382 Lower interest rates on public debt under the euro furthermore saved the 
Italian government an estimated 22.5 billion euro between 1999 and 2007. Manasse, 
Nannicini, and Saia add that eurosceptics may “caricature the euro as an ordeal that 
northern European countries (e.g., Germany) have conceived to exploit the poorer south,” 
but examination of the data dismisses such claims.383 It is perhaps possible that the euro 
has indeed lowered Italy’s GDP, although a comparison of Italian data to German data 
should quickly dismiss any notion that northern Europeans are using the euro as a means 
of exploitation.384  
The EU’s Pooling and Sharing and NATO’s Smart Defense initiatives represent 
further cost savings and partnership synergies possible through multinational 
commitment. The initiatives offer member states the possibility of greater collective 
capability at lower cost to member states through increased coordination, planning, and 
trust. Pooling and Sharing focuses more on capability development by pooling weapons, 
services, and research while sharing force structures.385 The Alliance’s Smart Defense 
approach is intended to improve collective efficiency through planned prioritization and 
cooperation. Prioritization pairs national capability objectives with NATO’s goals 
whereas cooperation pools members’ capabilities to create military economies of scale 
and expand interoperability.386  
Both initiatives also encourage specialization, whereby (it is hoped) each member 
will excel in some areas while allowing other allies to excel in others, to form a holistic 
yet cost-effective collective self-defense.387 Although specialization faces the greatest 
obstacles to success, it also offers the most promising reward: greater spending efficiency 
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by reducing overlap and cutting obsolete capabilities.388 NATO coined the phrase 
“specialization by default” to describe the uncoordinated cutbacks it already experiences 
as members trim defense budgets.389 Bastian Giegerich argues that capability 
development commitments to NATO (and similarly, the EU) can instead achieve 
“specialisation by design.”390 Through institutional coordination and consultation, 
Giegerich states, “cuts would still take place, but they would be done in a complementary 
fashion, with a view to creating a balanced capability within the Alliance as a whole.”391 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, then the Secretary General, declared in NATO’s annual 
report for 2013 that “Smart Defence has begun to deliver concrete savings for NATO 
Allies.”392 Through June 2014, NATO completed a total of six Smart Defence projects: 
Helicopter Maintenance in Afghanistan; Demilitarization, Dismantling, and Disposal of 
Military Equipment (D3); Centres of Excellence as Hubs of Education and Training; 
Mine Resistant Ambush Vehicle (MRAP) maintenance; Multinational Cooperation on 
Munitions (Munitions Life-Cycle Management); and Weapons Systems – Managing 
Spare Parts.393 Giegerich further argues that the value of supranational initiatives extends 
beyond euros and cents: “The concept is not primarily about saving money, but rather 
about creating value in European defence, a challenge that European NATO members 
have struggled with for years. Value can come in several guises: as costs savings, as 
capability and inter-operability increases; or even in more intangible forms, such as 
mutual trust and understanding.”394  
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NATO established the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) in 2011 as a 
complementary program to Smart Defense which will ensure that the coordinated 
capabilities are able to operate effectively as one coherent force. Miroslav Mizera and 
Pavel Macko write, “If Smart Defense is a concept, Connected Forces Initiative is more a 
process how to make capabilities work and make them work most effectively.”395 Cross-
military education, training, and exercises become even more necessary in the face of 
budget cuts to ensure that smaller force levels can achieve a unified defense. NATO’s 
CFI will remain the ideal venue to ensure that Italian security requirements in the Euro-
Atlantic context can be effectively carried out. 
d. Nuclear Deterrence 
One could further argue that, because of the Alliance’s nuclear roles, Italy needs 
NATO as much as NATO needs Italy. NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept stated that the 
“the alliance’s conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence.”396 The 2010 
Strategic Concept adds that “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is 
provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance.”397 The Alliance’s 2012 
Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) also confirmed that nuclear weapons 
remain “a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defence 
alongside conventional and missile defence forces.”398 If not for NATO, the non-nuclear-
weapon Italian state would neither profit from nuclear deterrence nor be assured of 
nuclear defense of its territory. (This judgment excludes hypothetical arrangements 
involving Italy and some combination of the three NATO nuclear powers—Britain, 
                                                 
395 Miroslav Mizera and Pavel Macko, “NATO Forces 2020: Role of Connected Forces 
Initiative,” Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA), accessed September 3, 2015, 
http://cenaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/PP-6-2013-NATO-Forces-2020-Role-of-connected-forces-
initiative.pdf. 
396 North Atlantic Council, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” April 24, 1999, par. 46, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm. 
397 North Atlantic Council, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence 
and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” November 20, 2010, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm. 
398 “Deterrence and Defense Posture Review,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, May 20, 2012, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm, para. 8. 
 95 
France, and the United States.) As it is, Italy benefits from a strategic nuclear deterrent 
through NATO membership. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which posits that an 
attack on one alliance member constitutes an attack on all, assures any potential aggressor 
that Italy’s defense could include the strategic nuclear weapons of its NATO Allies. Italy 
has furthermore hosted U.S. “nuclear-capable forces” since the late 1950s at various 
locations throughout the country. A 1988 statement by NATO’s Defense Planning 
Committee notes that Italy has been one of a limited number of NATO countries to 
benefit from this program designed to link conventional forces with nuclear forces: 
European-based theatre nuclear forces provide an essential linkage 
between conventional and [U.S.] strategic forces. Seven Alliance members 
(Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom) participate directly in this aspect of the Alliance’s nuclear role 
and share the ensuing political and financial costs by the provision of 
delivery systems (aircraft, missiles or artillery) for United States nuclear 
warheads and by the provision of host nation facilities for United States 
nuclear capable forces.399 
While Italy has contributed to the overall Alliance nuclear deterrence posture, NATO has 
enabled Italy to receive the security benefits of Allied nuclear weapons without the heavy 
cost or controversy of producing and maintaining them. 
2. Arguments Holding that the EU or NATO Undermine Italian 
National Interests: A Critical Analysis 
Costs associated with EU or NATO membership can, in the minds of many 
Italians, undermine the country’s national interests. Nationalists point to the sacrifices of 
national sovereignty required to support these multinational institutions. Those who 
believe Italy deserves a spot among the institutions’ powerhouses—France, Germany, the 
UK, and the United States—may point to instances where the powerhouses have 
marginalized Italy by excluding it from important deliberations. Economists may point to 
the significant financial costs associated with the EU and NATO. Some scholars have 
even argued that NATO became less relevant or obsolete following the Cold War; if that 
was true, devoting resources to an obsolete institution would also be contrary to Italian 
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national interests.400 Any of the above opponents could also point to unequal burden-
sharing within the EU and NATO, an arrangement which—some could argue—is 
disadvantageous to Italy. 
a. Sacrifices of Sovereignty 
The member states of NATO and the EU have retained their sovereignty in 
security and defense matters. Yost notes how NATO members “continue to demonstrate 
their sovereignty and autonomy by their choices as to what capabilities and resources 
they contribute to NATO-led operations and activities and by the restrictions or caveats 
they place on the employment of their forces in operations.”401 France and Spain have at 
times chosen to participate in some NATO institutions while abstaining from others, 
essentially foregoing Alliance unity in the name of sovereignty and French or Spanish 
national interests.402 The EU affords similar exceptions in the name of national 
sovereignty; several nations have chosen to opt out of the euro, and EU missions are 
carried out by the willing vice the whole. The structure of the European Commission—
one commissioner for each member state—and the voting process of the European 
Council, where qualified majority decisions require approval of at least 55 percent of 
member nations representing at least 65 percent of the EU population, furthermore ensure 
genuine representation for all EU members.403 
A high degree of national sovereignty, however, must inevitably be sacrificed if 
the institutions are to reach their full potential or efficiently execute missions. National 
caveats regarding the nature of actions that a member state’s troops may engage in pose 
logistical and administrative nightmares. Yost furthermore asserts that such caveats 
“create friction among the Allies, owing to perceptions of unfair burden-sharing and 
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unequal exposure to combat risks, to say nothing of the impact on operational 
effectiveness.”404 States must also commit to sacrifices of sovereignty if NATO or EU 
specialization programs are to gain traction: Each member’s specialized areas would 
become increasingly critical to EU and NATO operational success while national 
militaries would be forced to completely abandon capability in some areas in order to 
provide excellence in others. Full implementation of Smart Defense and Pooling and 
Sharing programs would thus increase mutual dependency among member states both 
politically and militarily to a level which most states simply will not accept at this 
time.405 What happens, for example, if NATO’s mission requires a capability but the 
member states who specialize in providing that capability wish to abstain? Friction would 
ensue at a minimum, and in a worst-case scenario non-participation by just a handful of 
NATO members could bring the NATO mission to a grinding halt. Objections to such 
sacrifices of Italian sovereignty will thus remain at least partially justifiable for the 
foreseeable future. 
b. Italy’s Exclusion Syndrome 
Another Italian frustration with Euro-Atlantic institutions revolves around 
what Gale Mattox and Arthur Rachwald term the “exclusion syndrome.”406 Wight 
asserted that Europe accepted Italy as a “Great Power” following Italian unification 
yet a “national inferiority complex” remains because Italy has never proven itself in 
war.407 Italy continues to seek inclusion in the top tier of Euro-Atlantic powers—
namely France, Germany, the UK, and the United States—and tends to feel 
marginalized when it is excluded. The 1994 NATO Contact Group for the former 
Yugoslavia, from which NATO powers excluded Italy, is an oft-cited example. Italy 
clearly had a vested interest in the nearby Bosnian conflict and was prepared to 
provide essential basing and airspace support to NATO efforts, but threatened to 
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withdraw support if it was not afforded a place in the decision-making Contact 
Group.408 Although Italy became a de facto member of the Contact Group in August 
1996,409 the initial exclusion remains a grievance. 
Assertive military ambitions and nuclear capability often elevate France, the 
UK, and the United States to inclusion in the forums of the top world powers. These 
powers were, of course, permanent members of the UN Security Council before they 
acquired nuclear weapons. Italy is opposed to French or British hegemony in Europe. 
Yost points out that making the nuclear-armed France “the guarantor of the European 
Union’s security would elevate France’s political status to level unacceptable to 
Germany, Italy, and other EU countries.”410 Italy and Europe as a whole were also 
arguably marginalized by the United States in the response to the 9/11 attacks and the 
follow-on missions in Afghanistan. Yost cites a high-level Italian observer who felt that 
the European Allies were “considered not as partners, but only as force providers.”411 
The most controversial exclusion issues, however, revolve around Germany. 
Italy generally accepts exclusion from top-tier global forums—as long as Germany is 
also excluded. The moderate military ambitions, modest levels of defense spending, 
and non-nuclear status shared by Italy and Germany have led Italians to believe that 
the two European powers should be nearly inseparable on the Euro-Atlantic and 
global stages. It would be awkward or even insulting to imagine an international 
forum in which France was included but the UK was not; Italians view Italy and 
Germany in the same light. Italy found the proposal of the UN “2+3 solution”—which 
would implement permanent UNSC seats for Germany and Japan as well as rotational 
countries representing Africa, Asia, and Latin America—particularly objectionable and 
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led the “Coffee Club” opposition in response.412 Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan have 
issued a joint statement of mutual support for each other’s permanent membership, yet 
today’s UNSC remains limited to the five top-tier powers accompanied by ten rotational 
seats largely due to the influence of other second-tier powers such as Italy.413 
Iranian nuclear negotiations carried out by the EU-3 and later the P5+1 groups are 
perhaps even more insulting to Italians. Germany is included with the five nuclear powers 
in negotiations with Iran because of its strong economic relations with Iran, yet by this 
logic Italy should also be included. Italy and Germany have long been Iran’s top 
European trade partners; both nations are among Iran’s top five trade partners 
globally.414 Italy has expressed a desire to be included in the negotiations not only 
because Germany is included but also because sanctions on Iran have dealt a serious blow 
to the Italian economy.415 Diplomatic sources further indicate that Iran has asked other 
countries, including Italy, to join the contact group.416 As Rome and Tehran agree on this 
issue, the dissatisfaction of Italians due to exclusion becomes quite predictable. 
c. Financial Costs 
Christopher J. Anderson and M. Shawn Reichert argue that “EU membership is 
not necessarily a positive sum game where everyone wins; instead, it frequently involves 
both winners and losers. Regarding public opinion toward the EU…winners are more 
supportive of the integration project than those who stand to lose from it.”417 In 2013, 
Italy contributed €15.75 billion to the EU budget but EU expenditures in Italy only 
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totaled €12.55 billion.418 Italy, in other words, might be called a “loser” or “net payer” 
because it contributed €3.2 billion, or 25%, more to the EU budget than it received in 
return. Italy’s excess contributions do promote a better Europe as a whole, which many 
would argue has countless indirect benefits for Italy. From a nationalist perspective, 
however, the direct result of EU membership is a net financial loss. The Anderson-
Reichert study also indicates that support for the European project is influenced by direct 
contribution gains or losses most strongly in the six founding nations—one of which is 
Italy.419 
The EU expansions of 2004, 2007, and 2013 have widened the gap between 
Italy’s net contributions and benefits, and the possibility of future expansion threatens to 
further increase this divide. Euroenthusiasts argue that the market expansion and removal 
of trade barriers of EU enlargement more than compensates for the gap by increasing the 
overall welfare of the average Italian household.420 This point is difficult to concretely 
prove, however, and it is thus disputed or dismissed by eurosceptics. The combination of 
increased scrutiny of the direct cost-benefit relationship over time with the likelihood that 
future expansion will reduce direct benefits may portend a bleak future for public support 
for the EU in Italy.421 
The significant financial costs associated with NATO membership may also 
undermine Italian support. Italy contributes approximately 8% of NATO’s common 
funds—which in recent years has amounted to just under $300 million annually—to 
cover NATO common budgets for civil operations, military operations, and the NATO 
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Security Investment Program.422 Deployment of national assets in support of NATO, 
however, is by far the most significant expense, and it must be funded out of national 
defense budgets.423 If Italy were to abide by the NATO mandate to commit 2% of 
national GDP to the national defense budget, it would have to spend nearly $43 billion—
an increase of $12 billion over the current budget.424 Budget cuts, however, have been 
the reality of the past few years. The government is also doing everything it can to reduce 
burdensome tax levels. In the minds of most Italians, therefore, the level of defense 
expenditure sought by NATO governments (including Italy’s government) is excessive 
and perhaps even out of the question.  
The NATO mission has undergone remarkable changes during the post-Cold War 
era; most scholars agree that NATO has undergone a significant transformation and 
remains essential to Euro-Atlantic security. Some, however, posit that NATO is less 
relevant than it was during the Cold War or even obsolete.425 Others hold that the 
Alliance is losing cohesion; coalitions of the willing are driving operations while the less 
willing are losing interest.426 Depending on one’s perspective on NATO, therefore, the 
aforementioned costs of participation may be all the more difficult to support. 
d. Unequal Burden-Sharing 
One stereotype within EU and NATO circles is that the richer and more powerful 
states carry a disproportionately large burden while smaller or poorer states “freeride.”427 
The term “freeriding” is perhaps a misnomer; Alexander Lanoszka argues that “the idea 
that states would trust their core security interests to others contradicts a core axiom in 
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international-relations scholarship…especially as violations of alliance commitments are 
widespread.”428 Unequal burden-sharing by smaller countries, however, is also a natural 
phenomenon, according to a realist perspective on international relations. Lanoszka 
asserts that “states determine some mixture of alliances and armaments that maximises 
deterrence at the lowest possible cost.”429 The benefit of increasing armaments for 
smaller NATO members is minimal, however, if they “cannot significantly alter the 
military balance, and if the collective defence of NATO ultimately relies on nuclear 
deterrence.”430  
Unequal burden-sharing thus remains a large source of discontent for some Allies. 
To exacerbate matters, the required unanimous consensus decision-making framework of 
NATO can afford smaller states a disproportionate amount of influence. Additionally, 
because both EU and NATO common funding contributions are based upon a member 
state’s own gross national income (GNI), the relatively rich Italy will inevitably pay a 
premium for EU membership or aspects of NATO covered under common funding.431 
Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu concluded that burden-sharing was relatively 
proportional from 1975 until 2002, but around 2002 “a pattern of rich allies…shouldering 
more of the defense burden for the poor allies” emerged and persisted at least through the 
study’s conclusion in 2010.432 NATO expansion, the fight against terrorism, out-of-area 
missions, and a growing divide in weapon technology all contribute to this shift.433 These 
factors, the authors argue, have produced “a two-tiered alliance with relatively few allies 
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both willing and able to embrace NATO’s new strategic doctrine.”434 The authors worry 
that the end result of NATO’s transformation may be a “less cohesive alliance where 
many allies have reduced interest in the outputs of NATO” and therefore the perceived 
defense benefits “no longer drive NATO burden-sharing behavior.”435 
In 2015 the immigration crisis also ignited heated debate regarding burden-
sharing within the EU. The majority of European Union nations have contributed to 
Triton through technical means, specialized personnel, or both.436 Distribution of the 
migrants once safe in Europe has been a much more contentious issue. The EU’s official 
website states that “it is clear that no EU country can or should be left alone to address 
huge migratory pressures.”437 Actions speak louder than words, however, and to date 
there is a perceived lack of action by most EU members. The EU announced grandiose 
intentions to redistribute up to 160,000 refugees who arrived in Greece and Italy among 
other EU nations, but as of November 2015 only 116 individuals had actually been 
redistributed. Greeks and Italians are perhaps justified in questioning the lack of action 
regarding the redistribution of the other 159,884, or 99.9%. Austria, Germany, and 
Sweden are among the EU member states that have demonstrated solidarity by accepting 
a large proportion of refugees.438 
European Commissioner for Migration Dimitris Avramopoulos first insisted that 
the member states must adopt a “balanced but mandatory emergency intra-EU relocation 
scheme,” but months of stalemate forced the Commission to consider voluntary 
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options.439 Those who argue most strongly for the quotas—Germany, Italy, and, to a 
lesser extent, Austria—are those hit hardest by the crisis, so it is logically in the national 
interests of these nations to seek a European solution.440 Prime Minister Renzi has 
warned that Italy will adopt an unspecified Plan B harmful to Europe if members cannot 
implement a solution: “If the European Council chooses solidarity, then good. If it 
doesn’t, we [Italy] have a Plan B ready but that would be a wound inflicted on 
Europe.”441 
Many EU members less affected than Italy by the crisis, including France, remain 
opposed to the mandatory burden-sharing proposal, posing a bleak outlook for agreed 
burden-sharing solutions.442 The Czech Republic and Slovakia have made headlines by 
declaring that they will not support a quota system. Lithuania has likewise stated that it 
has no intention to participate in a burden-sharing solution. Slovak Prime Minister Robert 
Fico stated, “We strongly reject any quotas…If a mechanism for automatic redistribution 
of migrants is adopted, then we will wake up one day and have 100,000 people from the 
Arab world and that is a problem I would not like Slovakia to have.”443 Czech President 
Milos Zeman expressed similar sentiments: “The Czech Republic should take care of its 
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borders on its own, it should expel illegal migrants…even using the army, should it be 
needed.”444 Such comments paint a bleak picture both for burden-sharing in the EU and 
the future of the Schengen Area if the immigration debate cannot be resolved. 
Although Renzi’s Plan B warning may sound sinister to some, many believe that 
Italy must escalate as necessary to achieve sorely-needed relief. The EU’s Dublin 
regulation establishes that EU entry-point states bear the full responsibility for screening 
migrants, processing asylum-seekers, and deporting economic migrants, yet both Italy 
and Greece are struggling mightily to meet this mandate.445 While some argue that the 
flood of immigrants could boost the labor force in the long term in countries with 
declining populations such as Italy, others worry that a lack of educated or skilled 
workers among the migrant population will cause the influx of migrants to be a net 
burden.446 For now, however, the migrants are unquestionably taking a heavy toll on the 
already-pressed Italian economy as Rome struggles to maintain proper security 
safeguards, process the large number of asylum applicants, and provide basic social 
welfare to the majority who remain in limbo. 
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V. CONCLUSION: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF 
NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN ITALY 
The influence of nationalist movements in Italy must not be underestimated. Over 
the past quarter-century, the influence of domestic politics upon foreign policy has 
increased exponentially both in Italy and elsewhere.447 The shedding of Cold War 
constraints has expanded the spectrum of foreign policy options while accelerating 
globalization has fostered an increased awareness of international affairs within domestic 
populations.448 Higher levels of European integration also mean that a much larger 
portion of the domestic population has a direct stake in foreign policy issues.449 The 
implementation and enforcement of international norms through the EU legitimize 
European intervention in domestic matters and thus further increase the impact of foreign 
policy upon the population.450 
A. NATIONALISM MANIFESTED IN BORDER DISPUTES 
Border disputes are a natural manifestation of nationalism. During the 19th 
century and first half of the 20th century, Italian nationalists were, above all, concerned 
with territorial expansion. With the pursuit of European integration following World War 
II, Italian nationalism turned toward preserving sovereignty within Italy’s established 
borders. Since the early 1990s, nationalist or eurosceptic movements in Italy have 
persisted in initiating or exacerbating disputes involving a wide range of borders: the euro 
zone, the EU, NATO, national borders, Padania, and the Schengen area. 
1. The Euro Zone, the EU, and NATO 
Nationalism is a strong impediment to the continued pattern of EU and NATO 
expansion. The EU and its predecessors have gradually grown from the original 6 of the 
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1950s to include 28 member nations today. NATO has likewise expanded on six separate 
occasions, growing from 12 members in 1949 to the 28 members today.451 Membership 
of either institution, however, is unlikely to grow significantly in the near term as each 
seeks to stabilize the bonds between existing members. The EU has placed expansion on 
hold at least until 2019; and although NATO announced in December 2015 that 
Montenegro will soon join the Alliance, potential candidates will nonetheless continue to 
face heightened scrutiny.452 Strong opposition to enlargement based upon perceptions of 
the European identity as well as national cost/benefit calculations further reduce the 
possibility of future expansion. It is possible that the EU’s borders will actually contract 
as nationalist movements across the EU call for national exits from the euro zone, the 
EU, or both.  
The calls of eurosceptics to exit the euro zone and the EU have grown 
increasingly louder in the past decade. The Northern League, the Five Star Movement, 
and (potentially) Forza Italia seek withdrawal from the euro zone. Nine other EU 
countries—Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom—do not participate in the euro zone yet still support 
EU cooperative security, so it could be argued that the security implications of exiting the 
euro zone are perhaps minimal. The euro has, however, generated positive effects for the 
Italian economy: reduced inflation and inflation volatility, new trade, and lower interest 
rates on public debt.453 A return to the lira could therefore have negative effects upon the 
economy. The struggling Italian economy is already imposing tight constraints upon 
defense spending, so exiting the euro could further tighten economic constraints and lead 
to additional defense cuts. This is not a certainty, however, and those arguing for a euro 
zone exit may believe the opposite would happen.  
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 One must also consider the cascading effects surrounding a euro zone exit. If one 
member exits the euro zone, will remaining euro zone members become more likely to 
exit as well? Italy’s history of bandwagoning cannot be ignored. It did, after all, enter into 
both world wars well after on onset of the conflict and shifted to the side which seemed 
likely to win and which offered the most attractive incentives. If Italy did exit the euro 
zone, would Italy’s support drop for the EU as a whole? Would a euro zone exit represent 
the first step toward a full exit from the EU? If one member left the EU—especially one 
as significant as Italy—would the possibility increase that other members might leave?  
It may therefore be prudent to also examine the security implications of an Italian 
exit from the EU. The Northern League already seeks an EU exit, and it is possible that in 
time other parties could become persuaded as well. EU cooperative security operations as 
well as Pooling and Sharing programs would be dealt a significant blow as Italy 
possesses the fourth-largest military within the EU and a broad range of capabilities. The 
Carabinieri are often ideally equipped to execute out-of-area security missions and are an 
integral component of the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), a coalition of militarized 
police forces from across the EU which specializes in crisis management. Only a small 
number of EU nations—France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and 
Spain—possess the capability to participate in the EGF, and the Carabinieri are arguably 
the most visible contributor to the EGF.454  
Italy plays several other distinct roles within the EU that would not be easily 
replaced. The personable aspect of Italy’s foreign policy, epitomized by the Berlusconi 
era, allows Italy to often act as a bridge between the EU and other nations—especially 
those nations which project a somewhat hostile foreign policy.455 The close personal 
friendship between Berlusconi and Vladimir Putin is a prime example, although Italy has 
also built strong relationships with Iran and former African colonies such as Libya.456 
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Giampiero Giacomello and Bertjan Verbeek assert that, in the decades following the Cold 
War, Italy has “intensified its attempts to play a mediating role between Europe and 
North Africa and the Middle East.”457 Italy has also emerged as arguably the most 
prominent advocate for support to the Balkans, demonstrating a stronger national interest 
than Britain, France, or Germany in Balkan matters and exerting more influence than the 
remaining EU members.458 In sum, if Italy were to exit the EU, the EU would not only 
lose a longstanding member but also several unique roles filled by Italy would be vacated 
or diminished. 
Although a small faction of eurosceptics such as M5S leader Beppe Grillo 
advocate an Italian exit from NATO, the probability of Italy actually leaving the Alliance 
remains very small. The tendency toward theatrics over reality is an engrained aspect of 
the Italian national character, and the comedian-turned-politician Grillo is a quintessential 
example.459 Luigi Di Maio’s statement that an exit from NATO is not under serious 
consideration more accurately reflects reality.460 Although the Northern League has been 
critical of NATO’s actions in Afghanistan, Libya, and elsewhere, even it has not gone as 
far as to suggest an outright exit from NATO.461 Even if a large number of Italians were 
discontented with NATO—which does not appear to be the case—a radical break with 
such an established relationship would be highly unlikely.462 
Even if Italy does not exit the EU or NATO, nationalist movements could alter 
the orientation of these organizations. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley assert that 
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NATO’s efforts “vary in their degree of publicness.” 463 That is, many of NATO’s 
activities also involve “private, ally-specific outputs…Allies nearest to the site of 
instability or with economic interests at the site may derive benefits not experienced by 
others.”464 Defense of the Baltics, for example, is largely a public good for the Alliance 
as a whole with few benefits specific to Italy—unless one regards the prevention of war 
via deterrence as fulfilling a fundamental Italian security interest. NATO activities in the 
Balkans and the Mediterranean, on the other hand, concern Italy much more immediately 
and directly. Citizens with a strong European identity are more likely to support public 
goods that benefit the EU and NATO as a whole, whereas nationalists tend to place more 
weight on the benefits specific to Italy. 
Italy’s strong voice for issues in its greater neighborhood—which includes the 
Balkans, the Mediterranean, and much of North Africa—also greatly affects the focus of 
the EU and NATO as a whole. Such issues may be of lesser concern to more distant 
Allies such as Germany, the UK, or the United States. Italian nationalism, therefore, 
serves to amplify Italy’s voice for local issues and may further reorient the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions’ focus toward the greater Italian neighborhood.  
Nationalist movements also affect Italy’s behavior within the organizations in 
terms of the country’s willingness to support foreign interventions. Grillo’s criticism of 
NATO is not aimed at the collective self-defense aspect; rather, he squarely criticizes 
foreign intervention by NATO and labels it an “action of war.”465 The Northern League 
has demonstrated a similar distaste for foreign intervention. During Operation Allied 
Force in 1999, the Italian government refused to officially refer to the operation as a war. 
Northern League Senator Luciano Gasperini argued, however, that NATO’s intervention 
constituted war and moreover appealed to the Italian Constitution, which condemns war 
as a method of solving international disputes.466 The Northern League was again firmly 
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opposed to intervention in Libya in 2011.467 Giacomello and Verbeek note how 
“Umberto Bossi declared that France had lured Italy into a war and warned that bombing 
was not the recipe for winning a war.”468  
Nationalism also endangers Italy’s role as a bridge between the Euro-Atlantic 
institutions and other foreign nations. Italy has overcome barriers in building 
international relationships thanks in large part to the personable aspect of its foreign 
policy. Xenophobic, and particularly anti-Muslim, attitudes promoted by the Northern 
League could undermine this approach to foreign policy and could serve to reconstruct 
barriers that Italy has previously managed to tear down. 
2. Additional Border Disputes: National Borders, Padania, and the 
Schengen Area 
For nearly three decades the Northern League has stood for increased northern 
autonomy and exclusion of foreigners. A stark divide between Northern Italy and 
Southern Italy has persisted for centuries and remains to this day; the invention of 
Padania merely served to codify the divide. The Northern League’s rhetoric of Padanian 
secession, however, likely peaked during the late nineties. Although the League has not 
completely abandoned or denounced the secession platform, Salvini’s relative silence on 
the matter compared to Umberto Bossi suggests that Italy’s borders will remain intact for 
the foreseeable future. Northerners’ desire for a more secure Padania and animosity for 
the South will persist nonetheless, and the influence of the Northern League allows such 
attitudes to be manifested elsewhere.  
Much more relevant to the contemporary security context is the Northern 
League’s far-right stance on immigration. If the Northern League gains additional 
political power, additional anti-immigration measures would be a likely consequence. 
Because the Five Star Movement insists that public opinion determine policy, the 
Movement’s support for such measures is possible yet not certain. The Northern League 
has moreover shown a willingness to oppose the Catholic Church, which has historically 
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exerted strong political influence, on the immigration issue.469 The Northern League has 
also at times implied that Southern Italy should bear greater responsibility in securing the 
southern borders as well as shoulder a greater load in accommodating immigrants 
entering through those borders.  
Nationalism and xenophobia have exacerbated the immigration crisis to the point 
that many question or even doubt the future of the Schengen Area. Several Schengen 
member states have at least temporarily returned to national border enforcement. This is 
not the first time, however, that an influx of immigrants has undermined the Schengen 
agreement. In 2011, waves of refugees fled Tunisia and Libya, seeking to reach France 
via Italy.470 Italy agreed to facilitate the journey of 20,000 refugees to France; France in 
turn responded by turning back trains at the Italy-France border and calling for a 
renegotiation of the Schengen Treaty.471 The current immigration crisis is likely to have 
much greater long-term effects on the Schengen Area, and Italian nationalism is no doubt 
one of many driving factors. Italy’s threshold for accepting refugees is significantly 
lowered by the nationalist influence, yet other Schengen members have responded by 
closing off outlets for the refugees. The Northern League has repeatedly called for 
suspension of the Schengen agreement in conjunction with an exit from the EU because 
the Dublin Regulation forces Italy to process all immigrants entering the EU through 
Italy.472 Even if the majority of these immigrants seek to reach other EU nations through 
the open borders of the Schengen Area, those other nations ultimately retain the right to 
close their borders when deemed necessary. The Northern League’s disdain for Italy’s 
neighbors which close their borders in times of crisis yet still regulate Italy’s immigration 
policy through the EU is expressed in a statement by Member of the European Parliament 
(MEP) Mara Bizzotto, who heads the Northern League’s European department:  
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On one hand, France and the states of Northern Europe…may reintroduce 
border controls in exceptional cases and leave…border countries like Italy 
more exposed to waves of refugees. On the other, the Eurocrats of 
Brussels will have greater interference and control over national policies 
on immigration…We have already seen what disasters they are capable of. 
The country under pressure from massive migration flows can no longer 
even take action independently but has to wait for the European 
Commission to assess the situation and make a proposal…to the other 
Member States. Adding insult to injury,…other states can still restore 
border controls and leave us alone in dealing with humanitarian 
emergencies. We have seen that the much-vaunted European solidarity 
exists only on paper because, when it comes to welcoming thousands of 
refugees and bearing the costs, each [member] goes its own way thinking 
only of its own interests…We must establish strict, clear rules and 
responsibilities shared between all Member States to handle any 
exceptional migration flows; otherwise it is it better to definitively 
renounce the Schengen [agreement] and the freedom of movement.473 
Italian nationalism alone cannot doom the Schengen agreement, but it is among a host of 
factors currently painting a bleak outlook for the future of open borders in Europe.  
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR BORDER RESOLUTION 
The responses of Italy and its EU partners to the waves of migrants must be multi-
faceted. The first step is increased vigilance in border enforcement, not just in Italy but 
along all the vulnerable external borders of the Schengen Area. In order to avoid 
undermining the open borders within the Schengen Area, all members must assume a role 
in enforcing the external borders of the Schengen area. There are only two EU 
members—Ireland and the UK—which are not Schengen members or candidate 
countries, so in practice the best agency to take responsibility for external border 
enforcement of the Schengen Area is the EU’s FRONTEX.474  
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The proposal to establish a robust EU external border control force is not an 
entirely new idea but rather the expansion of an existing one. The European Commission 
proposed legislation in December 2015 to increase the EU’s role in border enforcement 
by expanding the FRONTEX agency into a European Border and Coast Guard.475 
According to the Commission, the European Border and Coast Guard will be a “centre of 
expertise, a practical support to national border guard authorities, and a guarantor that the 
system will perform effectively:” 
The new European Border and Coast Guard Agency will reinforce 
Member States’ capacities at the external borders through joint operations 
and rapid border interventions. Its strengthened mandate will 
include monitoring and supervisory responsibilities, as well as the capacity 
to intervene in urgent situations either at the request of a Member State or 
when a Member State is unable or unwilling to act. When such urgent 
interventions are needed, the new Agency will be able to draw on a pool 
of resources which are placed at its disposal by the Member States and are 
available for immediate deployment. The role of the Agency to contribute 
to search and rescue operations will also be significantly strengthened.476 
Although the European Border and Coast Guard may be a step in the right 
direction, it stops short of a full replacement of national border control authorities. As 
long as border control ultimately remains a national function, however, inconsistencies in 
enforcement will persist and those nations on the fringes of the EU will be unevenly 
burdened with border control responsibilities. The alternative—full assumption of border 
control responsibilities by a collective EU force—would arguably offer a more 
consistent, equal, and effective method of controlling the EU or Schengen Area borders. 
Even the most vigilant border enforcement, however, can only go so far to control 
migratory flows and address humanitarian concerns.  
In December 2015 the UN estimated that there were 11 million people displaced 
within or outside of Syria alone, leading François Heisbourg to assert that “the theoretical 
potential for further Syrian refugee flows is some ten times greater than the number that 
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have already sought, or are currently seeking, a safe haven in Europe.”477 Conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq as well as in fragile areas throughout Africa and the Middle East 
suggest that high numbers of refugees will continue to seek asylum in Europe.478 
Richard Hartshorne posited that de-emphasizing the importance of the boundary 
is the most effective method to solve border disputes.479 The same logic applies to the 
immigration crisis: If North Africa and the Levant are afflicted with poverty and 
instability while the Schengen Area enjoys prosperity and stability, massive waves of 
migrants will continue to flow. The xenophobic approach of the Northern League—to 
wall off Italy from immigrants—therefore offers only a temporary and ultimately 
ineffective solution.  
To achieve a more lasting solution, the EU must not only aid with border 
enforcement but moreover heed the advice of Hartshorne. Internally, EU nations must 
exert greater efforts to assimilate immigrants both culturally and economically in order to 
avoid the formation of internal divides. If nationalists insist that that the ability to speak 
the national language should be a prerequisite for citizenship, then programs must be 
implemented during the asylum application process to assist aspiring citizens in learning 
the language. Externally, enabling the provision of basic human needs such as safety and 
stability in tumultuous regions within Africa and the Middle East, and thus reducing the 
massive quality-of-life divide between the EU and these tumultuous regions, would be 
the only surefire way to limit such overwhelming migratory flows. In Libya, for example, 
Italy has taken the lead (along with the United States) in efforts to establish a legitimate 
and effective national government after five years of internal conflict and resulting 
migrant flows. Achieving stable governance may seem costly and far-fetched in some 
areas, yet it must retain priority over more temporary solutions.  
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C. EFFECTS OF NATIONALISM UPON ITALY’S INTERNATIONAL 
STANDING 
This thesis cannot, and therefore does not attempt to, predict whether nationalist 
movements will ultimately lead to an increase or decrease in Italy’s hard or soft power. 
The available evidence indicates that such movements could affect Italy’s power 
aspirations in either direction. Some factors point to an increase, yet others suggest the 
opposite.  
Italian nationalism has historically supported a strong military, although this 
requirement was in large part due to irredentist territorial ambitions which are obsolete 
today. Contemporary nationalism does, however, place emphasis on defending national 
borders, and strengthening the military would be a logical consequence. Using 
Lanoszka’s concept that a state’s security in the international arena is a combination of 
national capability and alliances, a shift away from the EU or NATO would require 
increased national power to maintain the same level of national security.480 
A strong desire to cement Italy’s position as a middle power could also fuel 
attempts to increase Italy’s hard or soft power. Italy has sought middle-power or even 
minor-great-power status ambitiously since the end of the Cold War, yet this thesis has 
cited several instances of Italy being marginalized by the great powers, notably the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council and the “Quad” (Britain, France, 
Germany, and the United States).481 Giacomello and Verbeek assert, however, that the 
emergence of a multipolar international system and the “rise of regionalism…invite Italy 
to seek recognition as a ‘major middle power’ or ‘minor great power.’”482 A stronger 
military and increased military ambitions could both serve as tools to cement Italy’s 
status as an established middle power. Giacomello and Verbeek further note that “middle 
powers are not competing with great powers, but with other (aspiring) middle powers, 
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often in the form of ‘preferred peers.’”483 France and Germany are perhaps Italy’s two 
foremost “preferred peers” due to geographical proximity, historical rivalry, and evidence 
of competition such as jockeying over permanent seats on the UN Security Council. 
Efforts to shift the power balance could thus fuel additional competition between Italy 
and two of its closest counterparts within the leading Euro-Atlantic institutions, NATO 
and the European Union. 
Because status as a middle power tends to be more fluid than great or small power 
status, reputation is arguably more important to middle powers than to great or small 
ones.484 Membership in the key Euro-Atlantic institutions has greatly increased Italy’s 
international stature, beginning with the diplomatic reconciliation following World War 
II and continuing through the global power projection efforts today.485 However, 
perceptions of Italy as self-serving, whimsical, or unstable could damage its reputation 
internationally. Italy’s history of switching sides during both world wars, recurring 
internal political upheavals, occasional willingness to prioritize relations with Russia over 
EU or NATO policy, and troubled economy all serve to reinforce such perceptions. 
Calculated measures would be required to offset the loss of standing if nationalist 
movements caused Italy to exit the EU or even NATO, although this thesis cannot 
forecast the precise character of such measures. 
Nationalist or eurosceptic movements draw much of their support from those 
dissatisfied with the Italian economic situation. Financial crises tend to act as a stimulus 
for radical politics, and even the mainstream center-right party (Forza Italia) has joined 
the more radical parties in contemplating an exit from the euro zone. For movements 
promising an improved national economy, however, increased assertiveness abroad 
would be difficult to justify. On the contrary, efforts to improve Italy’s economic health 
could very likely lead to further cuts in defense expenditures. The Northern League in 
particular, which began as a regional party, has historically emphasized domestic issues 
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more than foreign policy. This was especially true of the Northern League under Bossi 
but also holds for Salvini. Objections by both the Five Star Movement and the Northern 
League to foreign interventions further suggest that Italy’s nationalist influence 
ultimately tends to reduce the country’s foreign policy initiatives. 
D. THE ROAD AHEAD 
Looking forward, the next Italian general election will occur no later than May 
2018. Public opinion could increase the influence of the Northern League, the Five Star 
Movement, or Forza Italia before then. Dramatic departures from current policies, 
however, are unlikely as long as Renzi remains Prime Minister and his Democratic Party 
controls nearly half of all the seats in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. 
Because the Five Star Movement opposes both the Northern League and Forza Italia, 
moreover, increased support for nationalist agendas is no guarantee that these movements 
can come together to produce unified action. The 2013 Italian presidential election 
debacle, in which a new Italian president could not be elected because of the Five Star 
Movement’s refusal to form a coalition with either the left or the right, indicates that 
radical politics may at times be more likely to produce gridlock than dramatic change.486 
In either case, gridlock or dramatic change, the impact of nationalist movements will be 
felt. 
More than two years remain between now and the May 2018 election, unless the 
President calls for an election at an earlier date. Although this may mean that nationalist 
movements are unlikely to achieve their desired agendas in the near term, it also leaves a 
lot of time for public support to shift between now and then—especially in the volatile 
and unpredictable realm of Italian politics. 2018 could be a landmark election for any of 
the Italian nationalist movements, despite the divergent implications of each party’s 
platform. 
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